The European Union and Counterterrorism in the Gulf of Guinea: Enough Is Not Enough

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Structured Abstract

Article type: Research paper

Purpose—Having focused primarily on other forms of threats to security such as maritime piracy, smuggling, illegal unreported and unregulated fishing, bunkering, trafficking, etc., literature on counterterrorism in gulf zones is comparatively sparse. This paper aims to fill this gap by identifying and explaining the European Union (EU)’s counterterrorism framework in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG).

Approach—With data obtained from terrorism/counterterrorism literature, including documented reports and other written sources, a comparative analysis and a theory dubbed objective reality-induced counterterrorism were used to identify and understand the EU’s counterterrorism approach in the GoG.

Findings—Although the EU may have invested increased money, troops, and political capital in handling terrorism in the GoG, there is still a major mismatch between the scale of violence affecting this region and the EU’s response.

Practical implications—The research provides evidence that unless the EU redoubles its efforts in the GoG, international terrorism will further gain ground there and it will be difficult for the EU to gain control of the struggle and thus legitimacy as partner in the worldwide anti-terrorism struggle.

Originality—The paper reveals the weaknesses of the EU’s counterterrorism approach in a relatively little-known GoG zone and that knowledge about such can
improve the quality of its struggle against international terrorism. Findings have important implications for counterterrorism stakeholders.

Keywords: Boko Haram (BH), counterterrorism, European Union (EU), Gulf of Guinea (GoG), objective counterterrorism, subjective counterterrorism, terrorism

I. Introduction: The EU’s Counterterrorism in Context and Approach

The academic field of gulf zone security studies has some reason to be embarrassed with the emergence of terrorism on waterways and coastal lands. Having focused primarily on other forms of threats to security such as maritime piracy, smuggling, illegal unreported and unregulated fishing, bunkering, trafficking, etc., literature on counterterrorism in gulf zones is comparatively sparse. Gulf zone safety and security has long been perceived and reduced to those visible criminal activities on the waterways, with little or no attention to unlawful violence on coastal lands, let alone dealing with them. Global interest in the GoG has expanded significantly in recent years. The growth of terrorism and the migration crisis in this relatively little-known zone all mean that the world must think about the GoG. Despite newfound attention, international efforts to counter terrorism in the region remain inadequate.

Since the September 11 attacks, the EU has become increasingly concerned with security challenges linked to international terrorism. However, the scope of the EU’s counterterrorism efforts has varied from one region to another. In some areas (such as the Middle East, North Africa [MENA] and Sahel), the EU has used objective counterterrorism and in others (e.g., GoG), it has been subjective in its involvement. In the Middle East, the EU collaborated within the force-multiplying framework of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, and thanks to such effort, the Coalition, which had already liberated Fallujah, Ramadi, and Tikrit, launched the military campaign to liberate Mosul and Raqqah.¹ This military-led counterterrorism can be understood on the grounds that ISIS pursued mass-casualty terrorist attacks against European symbolic targets and public spaces within Europe, along with a marked increase in the rate of returning foreign terrorist fighters from Syria and Iraq.²

In North Africa and the Sahel, the EU and member states have been objectively involved in counterterrorism. In 2011 for example, the EU developed the “European Union strategy for security and development in the Sahel,” identifying poverty, States’ weak capacity of governance, the regional repercussions of the Libyan conflict, narcoterrorism, and religious fundamentalism as the threats to European countries emanating from Sahelian countries.³ The EU also supported the Malian government in protecting the population and safeguarding the territorial integrity of Mali from terrorist attacks. Indeed, the EU’s objective counterterrorism in North Africa and Sahel can be explained by the fact that the EU and some member states have been
targets of terrorist groups operating in both regions. Chaos in Libya, persistent pockets of terrorism in Algeria, and terrorist groups affiliated with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and ISIS have also exploited the Tunisia-Algeria-Libya triangle to traffic weapons and jihadis. The French-led Operation Barkhane in the Sahel is succeeding in disrupting some jihadi networks in northern Mali.

Paradoxically, the terrorism-affected GoG has remained relatively unaffected by the EU’s objective counterterrorism framework. This paper attempts to address three questions: (1) why the EU does not care enough in the struggle against international terrorism in the GoG; (2) how it does not care enough; and (3) why it should care enough.

This paper argues that the EU’s subjective counterterrorism in the GoG is a consequence of misconception of the scope of the terrorist threat from that zone. The EU seems to underestimate the scope of danger terrorism from the GoG represents. This can be explained by the naïve belief that EU interests are not the primary targets of terrorists, and no spectacular terrorist attack on European soil has been reported to have come from the region. The EU seems to be feeling the pinch of migration, maritime piracy, bunkering, smuggling, and illegal unreported fishing than any other form of threat to its security coming from the GoG. Regrettably, EU nationals have been victims of kidnappings and other forms of terrorist threats. Although the EU may have invested increased money, troops, and political capital in handling terrorism in the GoG in recent years, this research finds that there is still a major mismatch between the scale of violence affecting this region and the EU’s response. If the EU is not objectively involved, it can make the pursuit of its interests more complicated in this new zone of safe havens and refuge by criminal networks and terrorist groups. An objective counterterrorism policy will reflect a wider EU approach to counterterrorism given that the EU has an institutional maritime connection with GoG States.

The work begins with an examination of the background of EU–GoG relations within the framework of terrorism and the foundations of terrorism in the GoG. The methodology is then examined with a focus on two theories (objective and subjective reality-induced counterterrorism). The next section demonstrates how the EU does not care enough about counterterrorism. This is followed by an analysis of the reasons behind the EU’s counterterrorism reluctance and the reasons why the EU should care enough. In the conclusion, an attempt is made to justify assumptions with a specific recommendation to overcome the problems of counterterrorism arrangements in the GoG.

1.1 The Foundation of Terrorism in the GoG

According to Martin Miller, terrorism has its roots in political violence with origins in the pre-modern era, as a necessary part of the contestation over the legitimacy of established authority, and aspirations to power at the expense of unarmed civilians. This implies that political violence is as old as mankind and, as he rightly puts it, all things political begin with God or Aristotle. What may be difficult is to
situate a particular type of terrorism within the framework of a geographical location and era. Political violence in the GoG could be traced back to the pre-colonial era. Inter- and intra-tribal wars characterized daily life among settled tribes along the vast expanse of water stretching from Liberia to Gabon. West African empires were involved in wars of both conquest and defeat, and the struggle was over the control of geographical space, power and authority. Political violence expressed in warfare is therefore a tradition known to and practiced by the people of Africa, including the GoG.7

With the advent of colonialism, political violence in the GoG took the form of (armed) resistance against European colonial penetration into the interior and colonial administration. Although most of the resistances ended with the defeat of Africans, it did not put an end to attempts by subgroups to use violence against established colonial authority. Pockets of resistance persisted against European colonial administration. After World War I and World War II, the creation of United Nations Trusteeship framework, and its promotion of independence and self-government of colonial peoples, the quest for independence by some mandate/trust territories was still acquired through bloodshed. Although most GoG states gained independence through negotiation with outgoing European colonial rulers during the late 1950s and 1960s, some experienced wars between colonial and white settler regimes and armed GoG nationalist insurgents. For example, Portugal fought African nationalist insurgencies in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau during the 1960s and early 1970s, which led to a military coup in Lisbon in 1974 and a sudden withdrawal from Africa.

Nevertheless, it was the discovery of oil and gas in the GoG and the inability of States in the region to secure these resources that led to the foundation of modern non-state terrorism in the region. Armed subgroups have not excluded from the trending scramble for oil and gas. The number of recorded terrorist groups and violent insurgencies has increased as a result of the discovery of oil and gas resources. This has in turn led to the development of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency frameworks, with the collaboration of foreign partners including the EU, the U.S. and China. However, it is the U.S. that is championing the military framework of counterterrorism at this moment in time.8

1.2 Background to EU–GoG Relations: The Weak Consideration for Terrorism

The EU is an intergovernmental organization of 28 European States whose aim (among others) is to foster stability, security and prosperity, democracy, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law not only within Europe but also at the international level, including the GoG. As an economic and political union, the EU’s long-term goal is to envision the establishment of common economic, foreign, security, and justice policies, and this cannot be achieved unilaterally.

The GoG is made up of the political and geographical union of States located in West Africa, Central Africa, and Southern Africa, nearest to the South Atlantic
Ocean. Insecurity at sea is a major challenge and some of the States acknowledge that they cannot deal with it without cooperating with the other States bordering the Gulf. This means that the boundaries of the GoG are not only determined by geography but also security. From this standpoint, any State which is not necessarily located at the sea but breeds terrorism and is closest to one located at sea could be considered part of the GoG. An example is Chad, which though not a geopolitical member of the GoG Commission (GGC), is bound to cooperate with other GoG countries through the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF), to combat Boko Haram (BH), suggesting that insecurity linked to terrorism is reducing the boundaries of the GoG. Terrorism in Mali (in Sahel) is also proving the need to think of the possibility of it joining the GGC, given that together with Nigeria, Mali also provides valuable examples of the longstanding interaction between the Sahel and the GoG.

Security is not the only determinant of the GoG. The GoG also refers to the oil producing States at the fringe of the Atlantic Ocean. Thus, whereas States like Benin, Togo and Ghana that are comfortably sitting in the GoG are excluded from the geopolitical delimitation, countries like Gabon and Angola, which though oil producers, are geographically not on the Gulf and located in central and southern Africa, are included. Whatever the determinant used, concerns for security in the region is the main task of the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC). Founded in 1999, the GGC comprises Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, and São Tomé and Príncipe, and is open to other members.

The EU and the GoG are linked through various partnership and cooperation frameworks linking the EU to Africa and the African Union (AU). But the history of the EU’s relation with the GoG dates as far back as the 15th century, when the area was first opened to European countries for international trade and commerce. However, cooperation between the EU and Africa started in 1957 with the signing of the Treaty of Rome. It provided for the “Regime of Association,” as well as for the creation of European Development Funds (EDFs), aimed at giving technical and financial aid to African countries, many of them still colonized at the time. Britain’s accession to the European Community in 1973 paved the way for the extension of the Europe-Africa cooperation to the Commonwealth countries, whether African, Caribbean or Pacific (ACP).

The Georgetown Agreement, the ACP Group’s fundamental charter, was signed in 1975, when the first Lomé Convention came into force. This marked the beginning of cooperation between Europe and the ACP Group. A new chapter on respect for human rights was included in the amended text of the convention, along with chapters on good governance, democracy and the importance of the rule of law.

A new cooperation model, called the Cotonou Agreement, was signed in Benin in June 2000 by the EU and by the then–77 ACP countries, representing 1 billion people (a sixth of the world population). It came into force in 2003 with a projected lifespan of 20 years. One of its underlying principles is that poverty is incompatible with a global trading environment.

A most recent partnership agreement is the Joint Africa–EU Strategy (JAES)
whose objective is “to address global challenges and common concerns such as human rights, […] terrorism, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the illicit trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons […]” among others.10

This background demonstrates two things: first the link between the EU and the GoG is indirect and second, counterterrorism as an issue has not been given the attention it deserves. This implies firstly that the EU’s intervention in matters concerning the GoG as an autonomous geopolitical entity is indirect—through the AU, the continental political structure. Secondly, this provides an understanding of the EU’s reluctance in countering terrorism in the region, given that the relationship from inception is dominated by economic determinants.

Table 1: EU Crisis Management in West Africa in 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>3/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>3/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>4/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10/20</td>
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Economic determinants notwithstanding, the EU has entered into partnership agreements against funding terrorism with some regional organizations. A good example is the partnership collaboration between the EU and the Central Africa subregion in the fight against financial malpractice including terrorism.11 In 2007, during the Lisbon conference, the EU and the AU jointly recognized the threat of terrorism in the Africa–EU strategic partnership.12 The GGC also condemns terrorism and recognizes the need to cooperate with others to combat terrorism. In Article 4 (f) of the 1999 Treaty, member states pledge the “non-utilisation of the territory of one State for activities directed against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of another Member State.”13 Article 24 authorizes the Commission to “enter into cooperation agreements with other regional organisations, Inter-governmental Institutions and third parties.” The GGC appears to be the legal body with whom the EU needs to enter into agreement with to counter terrorism.

Unfortunately, the EU’s security framework in the GoG is limited to combating crimes directly linked to maritime activities such as piracy, bunkering, illegal unreported fishing, etc. To do so, the EU has been implementing its Maritime Strategy indirectly, through a regional Action Plan that addresses these problems through cooperation, capacity building and information sharing—promoting the regional appropriation of the response process.14 For example, in 2013 the EU approved a small anti-piracy mission, CRIMGO (Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf of Guinea). Although such missions reveal the EU’s willingness and capability to secure ocean trade routes, it is different from European Naval Force (EUNAVFOR), which is present off the coast of Somalia and is well known to project the EU’s naval power.
II. Methodology

2.1 Comparative Analysis

The paper begins by observing the EU’s counterterrorism engagements in three regions where the EU counterterrorism framework operates. These regions include the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Sahel and the GoG. With data from terrorism/counterterrorism literature, including documented reports and other written sources, two categories of counterterrorism frameworks were obtained: objective and subjective counterterrorism. These two categories of counterterrorism interventions were then compared in terms of their usages by the EU and the difference in countering the threat. It was found that subjective counterterrorism was mostly used in the GoG and in other regions the EU privileged the use of objective counterterrorism.

A comparison is also made at the level of the types of actors involved and the nature of their counterterrorism. It was found that the players involved in counterterrorism in the GoG has no bearing. The actors include both States (Britain, France, the U.S., etc.) and international/intergovernmental organizations (the AU, EU, UNO, etc.). However, the approach and degree of counterterrorism engagement in the GoG has varied from one actor to the other, with the EU showing remarkable reluctance compared to China, France and the U.S. This comparative dimension adds evidence to the EU’s reluctance and provides an explanation of why it should care enough.

2.2 Objective Reality-Induced Counterterrorism Theory

An attempt is made to explain the EU’s subjective counterterrorism policy in the GoG with recourse to a theory dubbed objective reality-induced counterterrorism theory. This theory is drawn from the realist theory according to which States tend to react (sometimes out of proportion) when their interests are credibly at stake and in the absence of such, States adopt softer counter insecurity approaches. Realists tend to further assume that terrorism is an existential threat the military can handle. Objective reality-induced counterterrorism theory purports that objective counterterrorism is induced by a credible threat of danger from terrorism. Conversely, the absence of an objective threat to security from terrorism limits the probability of objective counterterrorism. This is the case with the EU in the GoG. The EU tends to minimize the scope of terrorist threats from the GoG, probably because of the absence of credible danger that could lead to a spectacular-type terrorist attack on the EU’s interests at home and abroad.

Terrorism represents an objective threat to security only to the extent that it inflicts considerable impact to victims. The damage caused by terrorism is used to measure the scope of the threat and as a testimony of the effective existence of terrorism. Actors tend to adjust under such circumstances. The U.S. attack on Iraq after 9/11 was a response to the 9/11 attacks, although the invasion could not be jus-
tified by Saddam Hussein’s possession of weapons of mass destruction; nor was it possible to demonstrate a connection between Saddam and international terrorism.\textsuperscript{16} The absence of such a spectacular attack on European targets coming from the GoG cannot induce counterterrorism retaliation from the EU of such a magnitude. The fear of terrorism from the GoG has not been institutionalized by the EU—i.e., it has not been incorporated as a belief, practice, or feeling into the EU’s repertoire of taken-for-granted knowledge of the world and its behavioral routines.\textsuperscript{17} If the fear of terrorism from the GoG had been institutionalized, terrorism would have been recognized as a situation to be addressed by an affirmative counterterrorism approach. However, on the other hand, the production of the self-same fear can make terrorists capitulate.\textsuperscript{18} Unfortunately, terrorism in the GoG is regarded more as substate affair than as an international affair. When the EU fails to act proportionately to terrorism in the GoG, the people of the GoG resent it and this resentment becomes a basis for terrorism’s support. As Cornelia Beyer puts it “Terrorists capitalise on the frustration, which they need to legitimise their actions and to find human resources for recruitment. They not only capitalise on it, they instrumentalize it by attempting, or promising to attempt, a recreation of the equilibrium, and to reinstall ‘justice,’ or even a certain alternative regional or world order.”\textsuperscript{19}

2.3 Approaches to Counterterrorism: Objective vs. Subjective Counterterrorism

To give a standard definition of what counterterrorism is, let alone terrorism, is complicated. This complication is partly linked to the variety of actors who have used violence to instill terror, including the many justifications given for the use the violence.\textsuperscript{20} Terrorism can simply be understood as the use of violence to create fear in a wider audience in order to obtain compliance or political gain. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights defines terrorism as “acts of violence that target civilians in the pursuit of political or ideological aims.”\textsuperscript{21} The UN General Assembly’s Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, in its resolution 49/60, states that terrorism includes “criminality acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purpose and that such acts” are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other natures that may be invoked to justify them. But terrorism does not only target humans; it also involves unlawful and intentional attempt to cause or threaten to cause serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a government facility, public transportation system, infrastructure facility or the environment. The damage or threat thereof is likely to result in economic loss when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a government or an international organization to act or to abstain from an act.\textsuperscript{22} Victims of terrorism include both physical and legal entities and this suggests that not even superpowers (e.g., the U.S.)
or international organizations (e.g., the EU) are spared from terrorism. From this perspective addressing terrorism should be the concern of all, not only States.

Counterterrorism literature so far considers counterterrorism as activities intended to prevent terrorist acts or eliminate terrorist groups. This overarching approach to counterterrorism fails to indicate which specific counterterrorism activity really makes a difference. For example, which is more efficient in the struggle against terror: diplomatic or military strategies? This study distinguishes between objective and subjective counterterrorism.

2.4 Objective Counterterrorism

Objective counterterrorism is the use of hard power to combat terrorism. This includes a range of capabilities such as military tactics, techniques and strategies that states and organizations use to combat or prevent terrorism. Objective counterterrorism is a repost or retaliation to a spectacular terrorist attack, which in itself represents an objective threat to security. It therefore has a strong consideration for terrorism as an objective threat to security. As Howard puts it “Today’s terrorism is not ideological like Communism or capitalism, with values that can be debated in the classroom or voted on at the polls. Rather, it is an adaptation of an ancient tactic and instrument of conflict.”

A monstrous terror attack is likely to prompt a military counterterrorist reaction that is often out of proportion. A good example is the U.S. military invasion of Iraq following 9/11. It considers counterterrorism as a punitive operation in which negotiation has no place. After all, U.S. policy is to not negotiate with terrorists. As Howard explains “Giving in to terrorist demands will prompt more terrorist activity. This is especially true for hostage situations, because negotiations with terrorists could potentially force the United States to risk having to meet certain demands for ransom or safe hostage.”

This counterterrorism approach has a strong pre-emptive and preventive effect and its benefits cannot be overemphasized. Without a military offensive component, the War on Terror cannot be won. The absence of a spectacular terrorist attack on U.S. soil some 15 years after 9/11 can be said to be a product of this counterterrorism approach, though it was also with the help of soft approaches. The disciplined centralized organization that carried out the 9/11 attacks is no more. Most of the group’s senior and midlevel leaders are either incarcerated or dead, while the majority of those still at large are on the run and focused at least as much on survival as on offensive operations. It was through a military operation, and not through negotiation, that Osama Bin Laden was captured.

This approach is efficient in addressing transnational non-state actors who possess or are likely to possess weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). As Russell Howard, writes “Pre-emptive strategy is necessary in a post–Cold War security environment, when America’s most dangerous adversaries are transnational, non-state actors who have access to weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and intend to use them.” It is also relevant for dealing with state terrorism; Saddam Hussein or Kim
Jong II may have held back from striking the U.S. for fear of retaliation though it did not stop the Taliban from hosting Osama bin Laden. It is believed that an efficient war against terrorism must mean a war (in the military sense) against political groups who choose terror as a tactic, although in certain conditions action and reaction can be excessively out of proportion.

The EU’s counterterrorism approach in the GoG can be understood to be subjective partly because of the excesses associated with objective counterterrorism. The objective approach is weak when it comes to dealing with the ideological dimension of terrorism, which suggests that it does not address the roots of terrorism. It may also erode support if it is used out of proportion. It is estimated that since the beginning of the war on Iraq, support for U.S. policy has eroded even further and hatred for the U.S. in the Muslim world today is greater than before.

2.5 Subjective Counterterrorism

Subjective counterterrorism involves the use of soft power practices in the struggle against international terrorism. The approach is often motivated by feelings of the absence of an objective threat to security from terrorism, i.e., the absence of a spectacular-type attack. It involves a range of diplomatic, piecemeal, dialogue, mediation and negotiation tactics in conflict situations. It is associated with the comprehensive counterterrorism approach often used to describe the EU’s counterterrorism strategy. Persuasion is a major instrument of this approach and diplomacy is used to win the war of ideas. It believes that dialogue or negotiation is necessary because non-State actors have no formal diplomatic voice. It can enable terrorists to understand the circumstances involved and have a deterrent effect by preventing an attack from happening.

In spite of its ability to promote discipline and effectiveness in dealing with the ideological dimensions of terrorism, the pre-emptive effect of subjective counterterrorism is weak. Under such an approach, it is likely that terrorism will gain more ground. The subjective counterterrorism approach requires a lot of caution and time (usually for humanitarian but also other concerns) to deal with terrorism, which is sometimes to the advantage of terrorist groups. It is this counterterrorism approach used by the EU that is condemned in this study because, in a way, it minimizes the magnitude of the terrorist threat from the GoG. Americans were warned regularly of the danger of catastrophic terrorism—and Osama bin Laden explicitly declared war on the United States in his fatwa of February 1998. A few years later, the result was 9/11. Therefore, the EU is not expected to ignore similar declarations from Abubakar Shekaw, a well-known terrorist group leader from the GoG.

III. How the EU Does Not Care Enough

Evidence on the ground about the EU’s counterterrorism policy in the GoG indicates that the EU’s approach is not an objective one, and this reveals the limits
of the EU’s policy. The EU’s approach to counterterrorism in the GoG is a reluctant one, characterized by indirect engagements, indifference, diplomatic weaknesses, piecemeal interventions, excessive caution, humanitarian actions, and overall an absence of a coherent security-led approach. Indirect counterterrorism takes the form of providing financial, military and diplomatic support to the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU). The EU’s military mission has assisted UN peacekeepers in the Central African Republic (CAR). In the DRC in 2010, the EU joined U.S. and African governments in persuading Kabila to accept a compromise that gave the UN force a new mandate when Kabila announced that he wanted UN peacekeepers to leave the DRC before the national elections. The training of local security forces is also an indirect intervention of the EU. Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions have trained local security forces in GoG countries such as the CAR, Niger, and Mali. However, CSDP operations faced a threat from budgetary pressures, the preference by some member states to channel security policy via organizations such as NATO, and a failure to build the EU’s collective capacity by sharing resources and expertise between member states. For instance, Germany, which is normally wary of operations in Africa pledged to send up to 600 troops to the UN mission in 2016. It also reveals a lack of a coherent approach among EU member states. In Mali, a proposal by the European Council secretariat for a CSDP mission to support governance in states affected by al-Qaeda failed to win approval. The Council even went as far as agreeing to close a security-sector reform mission in Guinea-Bissau that had been operating since 2008. In January 2013 when France intervened to halt forces advancing on Bamako, the capital of Mali, the EU was reluctant to support French troops. The main gap in EU support was in combat forces: proposals to deploy a French-German-Polish EU Battlegroup to Mali were dismissed on the grounds that it might have to go to Syria. African countries sent troops instead and France has complained about other European nations’ limited role in African missions. This indirect form of intervention meant that the broader task of counterterrorism has been left to individual member states (with France taking the lead) and the AU and UN, who have been accused by NGOs of showing excessive caution in handling some violent incidents.

**Table 2: Some EU Military Missions in GOG States, 2002–2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>End</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Union Training Mission in Mali</td>
<td>EUTM Mali</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>February 18, 2013</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Among the security competitors in the GoG, the EU has been consistently less active in developing an assertive security approach. In the domain of cooperation, the fact that Nigeria, the most significant littoral state is actively cooperating with China for investment in her oil industry and now even in regard to naval ships, which is surely a challenge to the historic predominance of Europeans in the region. China is also said to now have more personnel in blue helmets in Africa than any other permanent member of the Security Council, including an infantry company, while the EU remained focused in military action in Iraq and other parts of the Middle East.41 European pledges at the September leaders’ summit in New York were dwarfed by China’s promise of 8,000 and China has contributed 220 troops to the UN mission, MONUSCO, in dRC. The U.S. has been active in developing naval and coastguard diplomacy in the GoG led by the U.S. military’s own specialist African Regional Command (AFRICOM). The American military continues to transfer equipment to the Nigerian military, especially in the context of the high-profile BH terrorism. As evidenced by the transfer of ex-Coastguard vessels, the U.S. has had a longstanding interest in improving the security of West Africa, in part no doubt reflecting its strategic importance in terms of the global oil supply, but also in terms of countering the terrorist threat. AFRICOM has made the GoG one of its highest priorities. It continues to offer training and advice on coastal security and stands ready to provide more substantial assistance once requested by the countries.
of the region. Early in 2007, the U.S. announced that it would create a single Africa combatant command to bring together all the security programs the U.S. supports on the continent.

Piecemeal interventions were observed in some crisis situations. Apparently, the EU’s assistance to countries in the GoG afflicted by armed conflict has been perceived as relatively generous and comparatively disinterested. During the crises in Sierra Leone and along the Ivory Coast, the EU failed to intervene adequately. Rather Britain and France felt compelled to act, though their actions came across as politically motivated postcolonial interventions. Generally, the EU has been active in funding national and international efforts in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants (DDR); security sector reform; and state reconstruction. However, it was less successful in civilian operations relating to security sector reform in Guinea-Bissau in 2009 and 2010, and so far, the EU has not considered launching a maritime operation to prevent or repress acts of terrorism in the GoG, as it has with Operation Atlanta off the coast of Somalia.

There is significant evidence that the EU is not doing enough to counter terrorism in the GoG and has rather been indifferent and proven to not be a credible security competitor at all levels—preferring to intervene indirectly through international efforts and as individual member States or to divert military efforts to other fronts. This is an indication that counterterrorism in the GoG is yet to be a priority for the EU. This can be explained by the misconceived and misconstrued perception the EU has about the scope of threat of terrorism from the GoG. What follows is a possible explanation.

IV. Why the EU Does Not Care Enough

There is an EU misconception of the scope of the terrorist threat from the GoG. The EU’s reluctance to directly involve itself in counterterrorism activities can be explained by the naive perception that her interests at home and abroad are not the primary targets of terrorists from the GoG. Indeed, no EU member state has been the victim of a spectacular terrorist attack originating from the GoG. However, the absence of such does not imply that the terrorist threat from the GoG to Europe is not valid. This misconception is also a consequence of a perception among EU policymakers that terrorism can be dissociated from other forms of threats and hence counterterrorism efforts can be carried out in isolation from other forms of engagement. No GoG citizen or group thereof has ever been arrested or suspected for implication in acts of terrorism in any European country, yet that does not mean it could never occur, or that other forms of crime are not linked to terrorism from the GoG. This also implies that EU policymakers seem content to believe that spectacular terrorist attacks on EU interests can only come from traditional and well-known terrorism-prone individuals, groups and regions.

Connected to this misconception is the priority the EU gives to other forms of security threats such as migration. The EU seems to be more concerned with migra-
tion than any other form of threat to its security coming from the GoG. In 2015, European attention again focused on the Sahel and North Africa, triggered by the flood of migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea to Europe. In response, an international conference in November 2015 in the Maltese capital of Valetta brought European and African governments together to address the migration challenge. The focus was on reducing migrant flows from the Sahel and other parts of the GoG, particularly those passing through Morocco as well as Niger, Algeria, and Libya. Although peace and security were parts of the joint declaration during the 5th Africa–EU Partnership Summit, migration dominated talks at the summit. During the summit peace and security were understood only to the extent that they reflected “strong cooperation for effective, inclusive and accountable governance, to combat corruption, and recognize the role of civil society, the media and democratic institutions,” not the threat of terrorism and how to deal with it. This is an indication that terrorism seems to be isolated from other forms of security threats.

The EU’s subjective counterterrorism policies in the GoG can also be explained by the fact that the EU perceives African security as the domain of former colonial powers like France and inveterate advocates of the UN like Sweden and Ireland. The definition of the GoG sometimes takes into consideration the historical connection of the countries of this region to Europe. By virtue of their heritage, countries in this region speak a variety of languages, from English to French, Portuguese and Spanish. This perception has negatively affected the EU’s ability to deploy considerable military missions in conflict zones in the GoG. The EU’s deployed military missions are known to be small and short-lived such as the ones in the DRC and Chad in the mid–2000s. For example, the 2003 EU Military Operation in the DRC (EUFOR Artemis) consisting of 1,800 personnel was a short-term EU–led UN authorized military mission to the DRC during the Ituri conflict. Although the GoG is a growing source of concern to the EU, some EU members continue to take an interest in their former colonies (France focuses on the Ivory Coast, Britain on Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone, and Portugal on Guinea-Bissau and Equatorial Guinea). France continues to wield influence over and at times even militarily intervene in the affairs of several of its ex-colonial West African States. States of the GoG also tend to pay more attention to action plans from Beijing, Washington, Paris and London, than to policy documents from Brussels. It is on the basis of this that the EU is exercising unproductive caution when it comes to counterterrorism.

Conflicts of interest with some GoG States and resistance from the self-same states have limited the EU’s antiterrorism intervention capacity in that region. The EU has had difficulty building a stable relationship with some GoG States. Indeed, they have found common ground on some situations, such as the Darfur crisis, but they have also split over Zimbabwe as many GoG governments accused the EU of using human rights as a cover for colonial-style interference. It is likely that an EU direct counterterrorism intervention and policy in the GoG will be interpreted as violation of the right to sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of the States concerned. The growing criticism of European military stations on African soil corroborates this assumption. Sometimes, too, European attempts to engage in
counterterrorism end in stalemates due to resistance from States who are unwilling to cooperate meaningfully or implement prescriptions the EU will want them to take. The self-same GoG States are the ones who sometimes deny the EU’s offer of military and other forms of assistance. At some point in Mali, the EU focused on training the army, but the government insisted on launching an offensive against separatists in the north. Overall the EU has had difficult relations with governments in the region, which are very keen to avoid international meddling in their affairs. Although not part of the GoG, Egypt has resisted European offers to provide counterinsurgency training, preferring additional military equipment as a priority. Egypt’s attitude is also reflected in the behavior of other African States who are selective in the kind of support they want from the EU, e.g., they generally prefer financial to direct military support. In 2013, African governments were more willing to send troops to Mali and CAR, with financial support from the EU, the U.S., and other Western powers, than to accept an offer of military assistance. GoG States have also felt no need for any European naval force off West Africa because they have the capacity to handle maritime security challenges. Moreover, many of them are conscious of their maritime sovereignty and can exercise it. Senegal, for example, once arrested Russian super-trawlers engaged in allegedly illegal fishing activities, and Nigeria did the same with Chinese-owned trawlers in 2014. However, this argument is not convincing enough if it is considered that the EU has the capacity to intervene with or without the express consent of the government of States as it has done elsewhere. Thus, resistance from GoG governments does not significantly justify counterterrorism non-intervention.

The EU’s counterterrorism reluctance could also be a consequence of the failure to perceive terrorism as a collective problem and counterterrorism as a collective struggle. This argument partly explains the individual approach adopted by member states in counterterrorism. EU States still consider the responsibility for terrorism and counterterrorism in the GoG as a collective problem and struggle. Some EUPFOR missions have remained a source of contention between member States, some member States have prioritized collaboration with non–EU States, and they have sometimes differed in their approach. The EUPFOR RCA mission remains a source of contention between France and many other EU members, notably Britain, which questions whether it is feasible to rebuild CAR.49 France continues to complain about other European nations’ limited role in African missions and has cultivated Francophone African governments to support its counterterrorist mission (Operation Barkhane) while collaborating with the U.S. on intelligence gathering in Niger. Finally, whereas France pushed, in tandem with African States, for strong UN political support and potentially funding for a proposed regional taskforce, Britain urged a more cautious approach. The European Commission earmarked €50 million for the multinational force, but failed to disburse it immediately due to these disagreements. In 2010, EU member states clashed with the U.S. over the cost of continuing UN peacekeeping in Liberia, which held tense but relatively peaceful presidential elections.50
V. Why the EU Should Care Enough

5.1 Terrorism from GoG as an Objective Threat

As an objective threat to the EU’s interests, terrorism has been identified as causing physical and material damage to the EU’s interests and that of its member States. The GoG is part of what one European diplomat calls the “security belt” given its growing relevance to European interests. It remains an area in which the EU retains real leverage and its instability demands sustained attention. The EU and its member States have interests that range from strategic, economic, humanitarian, political, historical and value-based, all of which are under threat of extinction by terrorist activities. There is good reason to think the EU has economic interests in the GoG, primarily because it is involved in import and export exchanges. Although trade relations between the fifteen EU member countries and the GoG have been described as marginal, it is in the economic interest of the EU to step this up. The EU, being a net-importer of energy, receives 7.1 percent of its oil from the GoG. Nigeria is by far the largest source of oil for the EU; Nigerian oil imports to Europe account for as much as the entire rest of the region. Unfortunately, in the midst of this booming oil business, terrorism is just around the corner. Terrorists have infiltrated the oil business in order to get their own share.

There is every reason for the EU to believe the world is witnessing the internationalization of yet another Islamist militant grouping from the GoG.

### Table 3: Terrorist Groups and Areas/Countries of Operation in the GoG and Neighboring Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terrorist Group</th>
<th>Region/Country of Operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boko Haram (BH)</td>
<td>West and Central Africa (Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa</td>
<td>Algeria, Mali, Niger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Resistance Army (LRA)</td>
<td>Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jama’a Nusrat ul Islam wa al-Muslimin’ (JNIM) (Group to Support Islam and Muslims or GSIM)</td>
<td>Mali, Niger, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Tunisia, Chad, Burkina Faso, Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Mourabitoun (“The Sentinels”)</td>
<td>Algeria, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Libya, Mali, Niger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Qa’ida in the Land of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)</td>
<td>Algeria, Niger, Mauritania, Malia, Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, Chad, Niger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ansar Dine (AAD)</td>
<td>Mali, Senegal, Mauritania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ansar ul Islam</td>
<td>Burkina Faso and Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ansaru</td>
<td>Nigeria and Mali</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s compilation.
Boko Haram is the dominant terrorist group in the GoG with international connections. First, BH deliberately fashioned itself after the Taliban in Afghanistan, including taking up the names “Nigerian Taliban” and “Black Taliban.” Second, the sect’s founder, Mohammed Yusuf, was accused of receiving money from Al-Qaeda. Third, key figures in BH are understood to have met with the AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) leadership in neighboring Niger and the group has claimed to have sent its members to Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Iraq, Mauritania and Algeria for military training. Fourth, evidence is emerging that BH also has ties with the Somali militant group Al-Shabaab. Indeed, a spokesman for the group has claimed that BH fighters had been sent to Somalia and Yemen for further training. BH’s spokesman went on to state: “We want to make it known that our jihadists have arrived in Nigeria from Somalia where they received real training on warfare who [sic] made that country ungovernable…. This time round, our attacks

![The Greatest Extent of Wilayat al Sudan al Gharbi](image)

The maximum extent of Boko Haram in January 2015 shown in dark gray (detail) (Wikipedia). (See detail on following page.)
will be fiercer and wider than they have been.  
Fifth, there is also evidence that at least one hundred BH fighters are part of the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). This grouping split off from AQIM in order to focus on the jihad in West Africa and the Sahel regions. In jihadi training camps in Gao in northern Mali, BH recruits make up the bulk of the trainees. Such external influence over BH is also witnessed in the changing choice of targets. On August 26, 2011, the group targeted the UN headquarters in the capital Abuja. Finally, geographically, there is evidence to suggest that BH itself may be morphing into a regional entity, if one considers that its members are spread across Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Mali. These elements suggest that BH has potential assets traditional and well-known terrorists groups have at their disposal, and it is of paramount interest for the EU to understand that its counterterrorism is failing partly because it does not want to recognize this wider context of terrorism in the GoG.

In addition, the EU’s interests in the GoG have been targets of terrorist groups. As part of its operational activity, terrorist groups have made recourse to kidnappings and hostage taking of citizens from EU member countries. The risk to EU citizens of being kidnapped by religiously inspired terrorist groups is particularly great. Besides money, AQIM for example, has demanded the withdrawal of French troops
from Mali and the release of its incarcerated operatives. AQIM continued to hold EU citizens hostage in the Sahel region. In October 2012, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri suggested that his followers should take British, French, Italian or U.S. citizens hostage, with a view to influencing negotiations regarding prisoners in Afghanistan. In 2012, MUJAO was another group responsible for the kidnapping and detention of French, Italian and Spanish nationals. MUJAO also announced its intention to destroy French strategic interests, especially in Niger, Senegal and the Ivory Coast. In Nigeria, nationals from France, Germany, Italy and Britain were kidnapped in 2012. In March, a Briton and an Italian were killed in northwest Nigeria by a group linked to Ansar al-Muslimin fi Bilad al-Sudan (Supporters of Muslims in Sub-Saharan Africa), also known as Ansaru, during a special forces raid. Both had been abducted in 2011. In December, a French engineer was kidnapped in Rimi in northern Nigeria during a well-planned operation. Ansaru split in 2012 from BH, citing disapproval of BH’s targeting of Nigerian civilians. Both groups maintain a shared goal of enforcing Islamic law throughout the country and have conducted kidnappings of EU citizens involved in construction projects in northern Nigeria.

Ransom for a European family could be up to 3 million Euros—in February 2013, BH received such a ransom in exchange for a French family. BH was responsible for the August 26, 2011, bomb attack on the UN building in Abuja that killed at least 21 people and wounded dozens more and in February 2013, BH claimed responsibility for kidnapping seven French tourists in the far north of Cameroon and obtained ransom payments for their release.

Attacks on non-combatants have also been associated with the group. In 2014, BH killed approximately 5,000 Nigerian civilians in various attacks. The kidnapping of 276 female students from a secondary school in Chibok, Borno State, brought global attention to BH’s activities and highlighted its deliberate targeting of non-combatants, including children. In 2015, the group continued to abduct women and girls in the northern region of Nigeria, some of whom it later subjected to domestic servitude, other forms of forced labor, and sexual servitude through forced marriages to its members. Between January 3 and 7, 2015, BH carried out a massacre in Baga, Borno State; reported casualties ranged from 150 to more than 2,000 killed, injured, or disappeared. The January 2015 attacks and other BH operations in surrounding smaller villages in 2015 displaced an estimated 35,000 people and allowed BH to gain control of Borno State. In February, BH expanded into Cameroon with an attack on the northern town of Fotokol, where it murdered residents inside their homes and in a mosque. On April 6, BH militants disguised as Islamic preachers killed at least 24 people and wounded several others in an attack near a mosque in Borno State; the attackers gathered people in the village of Kwajafa, offering to preach Islam, then opened fire.

Although these kidnappings and atrocities have been ascertained to be motivated by the terrorist group’s desire to acquire funding through ransom payments for the release of hostages, acquisition of heavy weapons and recruitment of fighters from poor populations, they represent a patterned mode of operation observed among well-known terrorist organizations and of which the EU should be wary.
Unfortunately, it was not until after 2013 and 2014 that the EU began to recognize
the scale of security challenges emerging from the GoG, when refugees and migrants
began to cross the Mediterranean in large numbers. Beyond this recognition, there
is a need for an effective counterterrorism strategy.65

Terrorism as an objective threat from the GoG is also linked to illegal migration,
criminality and smuggling into Europe. The influence of the GoG, particularly that
of Nigeria, has also grown because of deeper smuggling networks and increased BH
presence, combined with a tradition of migration to Europe. Crossing the Mediter-
ranean from Libya now costs just 700 Libyan dinars (460 Euros at the official
exchange rate, but as little as 240 Euros on the black market).66 Meanwhile, there
are increasing reports that once migrants begin the journey from the GoG, smugglers
do not allow them to change their mind and “jump off the train.”67 These recent
flows from the GoG fall into the gray zone of “survival migrants” who flee not indi-
vidual persecution or discrimination as refugees, but rather generalized violence.
Survival migrants constitute the vast majority of global migration flows. The number
of arrivals by sea from Nigeria alone to Italy via Libya rose from 6,951 in 2014 to
17,886 in 2015, an increase of more than 157 percent, the second highest after Sudan,
with an increase of over 253 percent.68 This implies that Nigeria has been one of the
primary countries of origin of migrants from the GoG. A case in point of terrorism
linked to criminality is the existence of armed gangs throughout northern Nigeria—
these number in the thousands and include such groups as the Almajirai, Yan Tauri,
Yan Daba, Yan Banga and Yan Dauka Amariya. These gangs provide a ready pool
of recruits for extremists.69 It is therefore imperative for the EU to collaborate with
Nigerian authorities to neutralize these armed groups as part of the broader fight
against BH. BH also benefits from Nigeria’s geographic positioning as a hub for
drug trafficking. About a quarter to two-thirds of the cocaine moving from South
America to Europe passes through the West African countries of Cape Verde, Mali,
Benin, Togo, Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau, and Ghana. Increasingly, BH is becoming a
larger player in Nigerian drug smuggling.70

The GoG has been identified as a new area for recruitment and redeployment
with the objective of expanding the confrontation field beyond the traditional zone
of operations (including the Middle East and North Africa). For example, BH is
extending to the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin regions and has been able to copy the
Al Qaeda use of suicide attacks and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), as well as
employing teenagers and disabled individuals as suicide bombers. There is the danger
that if the EU does not energetically intervene, it could be seen as being an indirect
accomplice to terrorism.

The changing global environment also points to a need to redouble the EU’s
efforts in this area, given the following main factors. First, territorial gains in Iraq
and Syria will sooner or later lead to a situation where remaining Da’esh fighters
will move to “safe havens,” including in Yemen or Somalia, but also in Sahel and
the GoG. Second, after losing control of significant terrain, some IS members were
seeking to leave the combat zone, either to return home, or to travel to other conflict
areas (for example to Afghanistan; within the Middle East and North and West

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Africa; Central, South or Southeast Asia), potentially increasing the risk of more organized spectacular-type attacks in Europe in the medium to long term. Austria, for example, reported that it was particularly affected by migrant flows originating from conflict areas in Africa and Asia, although there is not enough evidence to assess whether potential terrorists have been systematically smuggled in via these flows. The Austrian government did, however, state that in several cases the suspicion that certain individuals were members of a terrorist organization was substantiated, and that some individuals who came to Austria along with the migrant flows were arrested for suspicion of supporting, or being a member of IS.

IV. Conclusion

Misconceptions regarding the scope of the terrorist threat from the GoG induced the EU to adopt a subjective counterterrorism approach, understood as soft power practices in the struggle against terrorism. This approach is opposed to the objective counterterrorism herein considered as the use of hard power (primarily military) to combat terrorism—an approach the EU uses in traditional terrorist bastions of the Middle East and North Africa.

The EU’s approach to counterterrorism in the GoG is a reluctant one, characterized by indirect engagements, indifference, diplomatic weaknesses, piecemeal interventions, excessive caution, humanitarian actions, and an overall absence of coherence. The EU tends to undermine the scope of threat of terrorism owing to the fact that so far, no spectacular-type attack on the EU’s interests at home and abroad is said to have originated in the GoG. In fact, the EU seems to perceive that her interests at home and abroad are not the primary targets of terrorists from the GoG. This is indeed a misconception given that the threat of terrorism from the GoG is objective and real, requiring objective counterterrorism. Terrorist groups such as BH (dominant group) and Ansaru in West Africa, parts of Central Africa, and the Sahel, AQIM and MOJWA in North and West Africa, and LRA in Central Africa, are using violence or threatening to use it against soft, usually unarmed human and symbolic targets. As part of its operational activity, these groups have made recourse to kidnappings and taking citizens from EU member countries hostage. Terrorism as an objective threat from the GoG has been linked to illegal migration, criminality and smuggling into Europe. Unfortunately, there is a major mismatch between the scale of violence affecting this region and the EU’s response.

The EU is therefore invited to rethink its counterterrorism approach and consider an affirmative and objective policy. This paper strongly recommends a military offensive component of the EU’s counterterrorism in the GoG. Without a military offensive component, the war on terror cannot be won, argues Barry Posen, and as Russell Howard concludes, “When terrorists or their support structures can be found and fixed, pre-emptive and preventive attacks will accomplish more against them, dollar for dollar, than the investment in passive defences.”
Notes

2. French President Hollande renewed his commitment to the fight against ISIS in the aftermath of the July 14 ISIS-claimed terrorist attack in Nice, redeploying the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle to support intensified airstrikes against ISIS. France has also deployed approximately 3,500 troops to engage in Defeat-ISIS operations, as well as strike and refueling tanker aircraft.
10. See JAES context declaration.
13. The recent collaboration between Cameroon and Nigeria to extradite suspected Cameroon Anglophone secessionists arrested in Nigeria could be interpreted as acting to respect this treaty.
15. For a revealing discussion of this, see David Frum and Richard Perle, An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror (New York: Random House, 2003).
18. The U.S. invasion of Iraq was as much about creating fear and paralysis among the Iraqi military as it was about using the U.S. military’s advantages in information, speed, and manoeuvring to destroy Iraqi military forces or kill their soldiers.
22. Ibid.

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25. Ibid., p. 456.
29. Ibid., p. 454.
31. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
37. European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2016, p. 28
38. Ibid., p. 32
41. European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2015, p. 90.
42. Patrice Sartre, Responding to Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea (New York: International Peace Institute, July 2014)
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
49. EUPF Scorecard 2015, p. 107.
50. European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2012, p. 127
53. Ibid.
61. Ibid.


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