

Analysis of Brazil's Geopolitical Design: Prioritizing the South American Regional Integration Maneuver

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Structured Abstract

Article Type: Research Paper

Purpose—This paper lays out an empirical analysis of Brazil's geopolitical design and, at the same time, comprises an empirical test to the concept of *geomisguidance*. Starting with the assumption that Brazil can be assessed as a maritime country, the paper argued that the South American integration maneuver, which is Brazil's priority in terms of geopolitical design, stands in opposition to a grand strategy of Brazil as a *sea power*.

Approach—Neoclassical geopolitics welded with elements from the neoclassical realist theory provided the theoretic-methodological framework used in the research.

Findings—As for findings, besides testing a new concept (*geomisguidance*), the paper concluded that (1) Brazil's priority, in terms of geopolitical design, has been the South American integration indeed, that (2) despite the fact that the relative material state potential of Brazil has been fairly high and that the systemic constraints have been permissive to changes on the international chessboard, Brazil has not been able to increase its influence on the international arena, and that (3) that is a result of the positioning of Brazilian *élites'* deviation from the national interests.

Originality—In this context, the paper constitutes an empirical research piece,

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Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies / Volume 5, Number 1 / Winter/Spring 2018 / pp. 5–22 /
ISSN 2288-6834 (Print) / © 2017 Yonsei University

devoted to explaining the foreign policy outcomes in Brazil, with a special attention to the international system.

Keywords: Brazil, *élites*, foreign policy, Latin American integration, Workers' Party

Introduction

It has been explained by the author elsewhere that the continentalization “strategy” was a misguided prescription of Brazilian School of Geopolitics (Travassos,¹ somewhat Couto e Silva,² but mainly Meira Mattos³). It was considered a misguided prescription because, in that context, the argument that Brazil can be accurately assessed as a “maritime country” was pushed forward. Among the deductions from that argument were (1) the necessity of the development of the Navy, and (2) the maintenance of the alliance between Brazil and the U.S.A.⁴

This paper will now measure the impact of that misguided prescription of continentalization “strategy” on Brazilian politics, performing an empirical test.

The empirical puzzle—to what extent can the South American integration, as a priority of Brazil's geopolitical design, be perceived as “anti-national politics”?—will guide the research. This means that the main point is then to gather, to present and to analyze evidence with the objective of sustaining the argument that the South American regional integration maneuver (a *geoconjunctive* process) has been conducted by the Brazilian *élites* from an anti-national dynamics. Therefore, the paper will also introduce the notion that Brazil has been, during Workers' Party [*Partido dos Trabalhadores*] administration (2003–2016), a *geomisguided* state, due to Brazilian *élites'* *geomisguided* perceptions and incapacities.

In order to develop that argument, three sections will be structured. Section I will be devoted to the independent variables “relative material state potential of Brazil” and “systemic constraints.” Section II will comprise the intervening variables “*élites'* perceptions and *élites'* capacities.” Finally, section III will focus on the analysis of Brazil's geopolitical design *tout court*.

The compactness of the methodology will be assured both (1) by the deductive logic, i.e., from geopolitical concepts to the empirical political reality, and (2) by the framework of geopolitical studies (or neoclassical geopolitics), which includes elements of the neoclassical realist theory (particularly the variables which were just mentioned above).

A closing memo in this introduction goes to the definition of central concepts used in the paper. While (1) “geopolitical design” means the identification of both the list of state's goals and its hierarchy (i.e., research on diplomatic, military and intelligence/secret services sources)⁵; (2) “*élites*” [in the original French] must be understood as the “foreign policy executive,” or the “state” from an instrumental perspective, i.e., “the top officials and central institutions of government charged with external defense and the conduct of diplomacy.”⁶ Finally, the innovative concept

of “*geomisguidance*,” created by the author, refers to one specific classification of the sense of space [*Raumsinn*] that the *élites* have about the geographical setting’s incentives or possibilities—a negative classification that names misguided perceptions.

Analyzing Brazil Through the Independent Neoclassical Realist Variables

The analysis will follow the guidelines of the model of geopolitical factors developed in other works.⁷

Starting with the variable of relative material state potential, it is important to underline [Space—geopolitical factor #1] that Brazil is the 5th largest country in the world, occupying 45 percent of South American sub-continent. Slightly smaller than the U.S.A., Brazil has borders with all South American countries except with Ecuador and Chile, in a total of 16,145 km of land borders (much longer than Brazil’s coastline). After Greenland, Brazil has the largest coastline on the Atlantic (more extensive than the U.S. east coastline) with 7,491 km.⁸

As Travassos noted, South America is divided in North/South by the Amazon forest around the Amazon River, and East/West by the Andean mountains.⁹ These two geographical features complicate the circulation in the region [geopolitical factor #3], consequently turning regional integration hard to achieve in geographical terms.


If it is hard to connect the coast to the interior, it is likewise hard to connect Brazilian cities along the coastline due to specific geographical features (e.g., mountains).

The fact that South American integration has been pursued by ideological guidelines cannot eliminate these difficulties presented by geography.

Inside the Brazilian territory, the problem of territorial integration remains. There is a severe lack of internal territorial cohesion, so it is easily understandable why this was a key point for the Brazilian School of Geopolitics. In the Amazon basin, there is no relevant agriculture, no large human settlements, and the area is hard to control in security terms. Moreover, the creation of territorial reserves (mainly by the *Workers’ Party* administration)—which is linked to transnational interests—have been worsening a critical risk of appearance of exclaves inside Brazil, jeopardizing the country’s territorial integrity. This topic will be covered below.

On the other hand, Brazilian highlands on the coast—an area that corresponds to Brazil’s geohistorical nucleus [cf. map 1]—comprise the majority of the population and the country’s richest areas (including the state’s ecumene: the triangle Rio de Janeiro-São-Paulo-Belo Horizonte). Yet, as it was already pointed out, it is hard to circulate in this area too.

Concerning the Position [geopolitical factor #2] it assumes particular importance the city of Natal (e.g., Rampa, Fernando de Noronha Island), in the Northeast region, since the air bases located there were essential to the U.S. Air Force in the



Map 1. Brazil's geohistorical nucleus.¹⁰

defeat of Nazi forces in the North of Africa during World War II: the Natal-Dakar air route.

Brazil's archipelagos (e.g., Fernando de Noronha, and Trindade e Martim Vaz) are also essential for maritime power projection.

In terms of regional context, while Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay constitute three buffer states around Brazil, Colombian FARC [*Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia*] with their activities of drug and arms trafficking, and an unstable Venezuela, represent threats in the neighborhood of the North of Brazil.

Concerning resources [geopolitical factor #4] Brazil is a rich country. Brazil is the 9th biggest producer of oil, and its natural gas reserves were, in 2015, estimated at 16 trillion cubic feet.¹¹ After the U.S.A., Brazil is the second-largest producer and consumer of the biofuel ethanol.¹² The country has two nuclear power plants,¹³ and another one under construction.¹⁴

Brazil possesses 8,233 cubic km of fresh water reserves.¹⁵ The Amazon rainforest provides rubber and extensive reserves of wood. As for metals, Brazil possesses the largest niobium reserve in the world and the second largest reserve of iron (after Australia). The country is self-sufficient in terms of food.¹⁶

In 2014, Brazil had the 7th largest economy in the world.¹⁷ Although the Chinese

economic slowdown has been affecting Brazil—the Chinese market is currently not importing as many raw materials as in the past—the recession (the worst in a century), that the country is currently experiencing, is less caused by that factor than by the *Workers' Party* bribery moves (nicknamed *Mensalão*, *Petrolão*, etc.), which were recently exposed to the light of day. Moreover, Brazil is highly dependent on foreign capital, and foreign trade. As for the economic freedom, Brazil is “mostly unfree,” located behind Nigeria or Mali in the rankings.¹⁸

Regarding the psychosocial projection on the territory [geopolitical factor #5], Brazil is the 5th most populated country in the world, with roughly 204 million people, a predominantly young population.¹⁹ Despite that high number, the population density is very low (particularly in the North and in the central regions), something that creates problems with territorial integration. That is so because some cities are highly inhabited (Metropolitan areas: São Paulo with 21 million, Rio de Janeiro with 12 million, Belo Horizonte with 5 million)—almost 86 percent of Brazilian people were living in a city in 2015. In this way, on the national level, the cohesion of the population is low (e.g., existence of social disparities).

As for other characteristics of the Brazilian people, they are mostly Catholic and their peaceful character, in general, appears to be very tolerant and flexible. In this context, Brazilians are prone to accommodate controversial ideas or behaviors in respect to their own previous ideas and behaviors.²⁰ Despite this flexibility and relaxed character, the blood-spattered communist *guerrilha* from the 30s/60s until the 70s, should be remembered.

The last geopolitical factor analyses the politico-military structures [geopolitical factor #6]. The political and judicial systems in Brazil, in general, are highly corrupt.²¹ Although the Constitution has been formally respected and the institutions kept working in what seems to be the regular way, the *Workers' Party* has been infiltrating its agents, militants, supporters in the state's structure in politics, bureaucracy, judiciary system, education, public companies, cultivating sympathies even within the Armed Forces.²² The impeachment process that President Rousseff suffered did not change the situation as of yet.

Ranked #24 in the soft power index,²³ together with the above-mentioned notions of “flexible character” and “friendly people,” Brazil is associated with images of “party,” “samba,” “carnival,” “soccer,” “sex-paradise,” “beaches and the sun.” These cultural foreign policy images contrast with a brutal number of intentional homicides (more than 56,000 assault deaths in 2012, four times more than in the U.S.A.²⁴), high levels of drug trafficking and drug consumption, extortion, kidnapping, corruption, failed prison system, diseases (e.g., Zika, Dengue). With the exception of the latter, all the rest seems having been stimulated or protected by the government itself, namely through protection or benevolent attitude towards crime.²⁵ That correlation of government and crime can also be identified due to the connections of *Workers' Party* with criminal organizations.²⁶ The main idea to keep in mind here is that crime and social instability favors a revolutionary environment, which is indispensable to the success of the *Worker's Party* policies in particular and the Brazilian radical left in general. In this way, the label “*narcoestado*” can be used, not

in the sense that the state controls the trade, but in the sense that the state is allied with forces that control the drug trade. The related corruption/drug trafficking/social chaos/*Workers' Party*, associated with São Paulo Forum, will be analyzed in detail in another work.²⁷

Regarding the leftist aspect of Brazilian political regime, it should be stressed that two of the biggest parties in the political system: *Workers' Party* (PT) and *Brazilian Social Democratic Party* (PSDB) were both created within CEBRAP [Brazilian Center of Analysis and Planning], which was constituted in 1969 by leftist university scholars, and funded by the Ford Foundation.²⁸ It is also noteworthy that both parties do not differ in the objectives, but in the modalities of action only. Examining a primary source, the former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso affirmed twice in a 2004 interview that “the dispute between his party (PSDB) and the *Workers' Party* is political and not ideological.”²⁹ There are studies devoted to the topic, for example, a study about Fernando Henriques Cardoso characterizing him as a political agent in the marxist-gramscian line.³⁰

The political situation of leftist hegemony in Brazilian politics and culture that is described still endures. Recently, some of the most well-known names of Brazilian University, who have links to the political power, met at the *Universidade de São Paulo's* Faculty of Law with the purpose of reaffirming the importance of continuing in the “historical path” towards “social justice” and “the dangers of a *bourgeois* victory that would destroy democracy.”³¹

Referring to the military sub-factor, Brazilian Armed Forces, which are the guarantor of the democratic order in accordance with the Constitution, have not interfered in the state of affairs, so far. With 330,000 active military personnel in 2015, Brazil was assessed, in 2016, as the 15th strongest military power in the world (above Israel and below Indonesia).³² Still, the expenditure on defense has remained relatively low.³³

As for allies, since 1995 till 2015, Brazil has been buying weaponry mostly from [in the order of importance]: France, Germany, the U.K. and the U.S.A.; and it has been selling to mostly: Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, and France.³⁴




Figure 1. Military expenditure in Brazil as percentage of gross domestic product, 1995–2015
(Source: SIPRI).

The military allies' network could be expressed in the following diagram:




Figure 2. Main treaties in the defense domain signed by Brazil (in action May 2016) (Source: elaborated by the author).

Concluding this brief analysis of relative material state potential variable, a reference to the hierarchy of the Composite Index of National Capability is made. Brazil was ranked at the #6 position, thus above Germany and under Russia.³⁵

The variable of distribution of power (or systemic constraints) is strongly connected to the variable just analyzed above.

With respect to the position of Brazil in concrete terms of Space-Power-Constellation, the country balances between (1) the fact that the U.S.A. remains as (in formal terms) Brazil's primary and strongest military ally, and (2) the ambitions and goals for the South American regional integration. The latter, among its many complex aspects, includes Brazilian active membership in the UNASUL (*União das Nações Sul-Americanas* [Union of South American Nations]), an organization that already encompasses the Council of South American Defense (CDS), which Presidency is exercised by the Pro Tempore President of UNASUL, who at the moment (April 2017) is Venezuela's President Nicolás Maduro—one of the main antagonists

of the U.S.A. in the international arena. Moreover, in 2010, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) with HQ in Caracas was created.

Through this analysis, the transitory aspect (therefore, contradictory) of the current situation can be observed. In 2007, Brazilian President Lula da Silva had already stated that the strategic priority was: “estabelecer uma estratégia de procedimento entre a esquerda da América Latina.”³⁶

It is noteworthy to remind that Lula da Silva made that statement not during a *Workers' Party* congress, not during a São Paulo Forum session, but into a MERCOSUL meeting. Hence the matter concerns directly systemic constraints. That empirical evidence confirms Brazilian diplomat Paulo de Almeida's hypothesis that MERCOSUL has deviated from its original objective of a free-trade area in the South Cone to be transformed into a Bolivarian instrument.³⁷ That means that MERCOSUL has become, at least to a certain extent, a São Paulo Forum instrument.³⁸

Consequently, sustained by such convincing evidence, it is possible to state, with a narrow margin for error, that the situation of Brazil's international alignment is changing. That change seems to be distancing it from the U.S.A. in detriment of both (1) the South American regional integration, which (2) has links to an approach to the Russian-Chinese axis.³⁹

Analyzing Brazil Through the Intervening Neoclassical Realist Variables

On the path of continuing to apply the mentioned theoretic-methodological framework of neoclassical geopolitics, thus respecting the compartmentalization of variables accomplished in the mentioned works of the author, the paper will now analyze Brazilian *élites'* perceptions and capacities. Nevertheless, it must be stated that it is hard to analyze these issues separately from a single case study about São Paulo Forum to be accomplished elsewhere.

One single argument will be put to the test in this section: that the conduct of politics by Brazilian *élites* is moved by other objectives than the promotion of Brazil's national interests.

This argument—that there is no compliance of the Brazilian *élites* to the country's national interests, and if there has been any, then, it was accidental or tactical—affects and is affected by Brazilian *élites'* perceptions and capacities. So, it is contended that Brazilian *élites*, particularly since 2003 until 2016 (the *Workers' Party* administration), have not been showing any sense of acquiescence to the national interests in the conduct of politics.

In this way, it is argued that, several times, Lula da Silva's political outcomes were clearly made directly against Brazil's national interests. Several examples will be listed.

In 2005, President Lula da Silva produced a decree for the creation of the territorial reserve of *Raposa Serra do Sol*.⁴⁰ The demarcation of 1,747,464 hectares of land inside Brazil (bordering with Venezuela) generates trends for territorial claims,

secessionism and, consequently, jeopardizes the territorial integrity of the country. Besides, it damaged the production of rice too, since the Brazilian rice farmers were displaced, and the roughly 20,000 autochthons, who now live there, do not produce rice in economically viable amounts. Finally, the infrastructures have been collapsing (mainly roads and bridges), and there are security problems as well. None of these problems existed before the displacement of the rice farmers.⁴¹

In the same line of interpreting this fact as anti-national political outcome, in 2008, former Amazonian Military Commander, General Augusto Heleno, classified the governmental policies in this domain as “regrettable, if not to say chaotic.”⁴²

However, *Raposa Serra do Sol* is not an isolated case. Until 2015, territorial reserves in Brazil have been as high as 13.17 percent of the territory of the whole country.⁴³ Therefore, concerning the territorial integrity, an anti-national trend can be identified. Yet, there is more to be added in other domains.

Applying Clark’s methodological guideline for analysis of statements of government leaders and their context,⁴⁴ in 2006, Lula da Silva not only did nothing against Bolivia—which unilaterally broke up an international agreement invading Brazil’s public company *Petrobras*’ facilities with military forces, and nationalizing them through a decree—but Lula da Silva himself confessed that he has previously endorsed Bolivian President Morales personally to do so.⁴⁵ The loss for the Brazilian company was around 872 million R\$ [roughly 482 million USD].⁴⁶ Yet, in 2013, *Petrobras* announced new investments in Bolivia again.⁴⁷

The creation of the University for Latin American Integration (UNILA), by Lula da Silva in 2010, can be also included in the modalities of action with the purpose of dissolving national sovereignties, including Brazil’s.⁴⁸

The dynamics of disregarding the national interests can be, therefore, inferred. In these circumstances, it can be contended that this argument is able to explain logically why Brazil has been accumulating states’ failures. Thus, the reason why Brazil has not been pursuing a “sovereign” foreign policy.

Tracing the causes, it is believed that this anti-national phenomenon in Brazil has its origins in the prevailing constraint of the international-leftist solidarity. If, on the one hand, Brazilian *élites* have been enjoying a leftist hegemony for decades, and more antiquity goes together with more power, on the other hand, within the same leftist hegemony, Brazilian influential individuals in society and culture have been, in the overwhelming majority, controlling the flow of information that the people have access to, at the same time that the political *élites* have been determining the (anti-national) objectives in the course of political action—more knowledge goes together with more power. The system is then extremely solid.⁴⁹

Lula da Silva admitted that his *Workers’ Party* aims to transform South America into a bloc, i.e., to virtually erase Brazil’s national sovereignty.⁵⁰ Rousseff continued in the same direction. Rousseff was impeached, removed from office, but current Brazilian President Michel Temer (who is not even a *Workers’ Party* member) referring to the UNASUL, already sustained that the South American regional integration maneuver must continue and that the institutions (i.e., executive bodies, a South American parliament, a South American court), in which those integration

procedures are based on, have to be multiplied and their power increased. A final mission of the Brazilian state, Temer proclaimed, is to help to create a “Latin American nation” [*sic*].⁵¹

It can, therefore, be identified an anti-national geopolitical continuity in Brazil, in the sense that Brazil’s sovereign national interests are disregarded. Furthermore, until the present, that geopolitical continuity did not change with the end of the administration of the *Workers’ Party*. That fact suggests the explanation that the geopolitical continuity is now promoted more by the Brazilian political system in general, than by a party in particular.

In this way, revisiting Taliaferro’s methodological steps,⁵² an anti-statist ideology can be pointed out, since the interests of Brazil have not been pursued externally. On the other hand, the existence of a statist ideology remains, but only in the sense of increasing the power of the state in the internal affairs, certainly with the purpose of enlarging the state’s capacities for control making, consequently, an international engagement is easier (i.e., reinforcing the mentioned geopolitical continuity).

In conclusion, the Brazilian *élites*, who were object of study in this section, can be considered *geomisguided* in terms of assessment of the *Raumsinn*, taking into account that the geographical setting’s incentive for a *sea power* grand strategy has been ignored.⁵³ Instead, the choice has been a *land power* geoconjunctive maneuver (the South American regional integration), accomplished under leftist ideological guidelines.

The empirical analysis of Brazil’s geopolitical design will strengthen those arguments.

Analyzing Brazil’s Geopolitical Design

The text comes finally to the task of assessing Brazil’s geopolitical design, i.e., to unveil and to elaborate the list of the countries’ interests/goals and its hierarchy.


The National Defense Policy [*Política Nacional de Defesa*] and the National Defense Strategy [*Estratégia Nacional de Defesa*] comprise crucial information for the research about the geopolitical design.

In those documents, Brazilian authorities expressed concern about a possible increase of tensions for: “the control of maritime areas, supremacy in the outer space, sources of fresh water, food and energy.”⁵⁴ It is needless to remind that all those problems are covered by geopolitical studies.

The documents established Brazil’s priorities in the following hierarchy⁵⁵:

1. Cooperation with South American countries;
2. Brazil’s area of influence includes: South America, Western African Countries, Antarctica and Caribbean;
3. South American integration: MERCOSUL, UNASUL, *Organização do Tratado de Cooperação Amazônica*, cooperation with CELAC, *Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul*;

4. Cooperation in the CPLP [Community of Portuguese Language Countries];
5. BRICS.



Map 2. Mapping Brazil's area of influence in the World as perceived by Brazilian *élites* (Source: elaborated by the author, from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mapa_mundi_divisiones_blanco.PNG).

Furthermore, the mentioned documents contended about (1) possible threats to Amazonia,⁵⁶ and (2) underlined the relevance of stimulating the South American Integration—“building up a South American unity [*sic*]” with the Council of South American Defense.⁵⁷ On the latter topic, it corresponds directly to Meira Mattos’ prescription calling for the continentalization “strategy.”⁵⁸

In the White Book of Defense [*Livro Branco de Defesa*], the South American integration was again proclaimed as a “strategic objective” of Brazilian foreign policy [*objetivo estratégico da política externa brasileira*] and the importance of UNASUL and the Council of South American Defense—in the sphere of defense cooperation⁶⁰—was reassured.

Taking into account the effort for the definition and accurate use of concepts, the use of the expression “strategic objective” to characterize a *geoconjunctive* maneuver is considered a failure.⁶¹ Besides, how can the objective be strategic if the documents themselves affirm that, technically, there is no opponent to be identified?

It cannot be ignored too that, within the mentioned priorities established by the Brazilian highest defense and foreign policy decision-makers, the U.S.A.—which has been Brazil’s traditional ally and it is still a member of Rio Pact⁶²—was not named once. In this context, it seems very hard to understand the U.S. Department of State’s almost enthusiastic text, listing the main points of cooperation with Brazil.⁶³ That cooperation has been massively reduced in the last years. That constitutes



Map 3. Map of Pan-Amazonia in the White Book of Defense.⁵⁹

further evidence that helps to infer that the international positioning of Brazil is distancing itself from the U.S.A.

If, on the one hand, the official documents under scrutiny stated that Brazil has no enemies on the international arena, on the other hand, it seems that Brazil's foreign policy direction has been oriented, if not against the U.S.A. directly, it has been treating the relationship with the "former" ally with irreverence, to say the least. This paper insists on the point that none of these geopolitical dynamics are independent of (1) the progressive leftist socio-political hegemony in the subcontinent, (2) the South American integration maneuver, and (3) the São Paulo Forum.

In this context of geopolitical continuities, some facts can be explained in a more coherent manner. For example, although Rousseff was impeached, the new President of Brazil, Michel Temer, appointed Raul Jungmann as Minister of Defense. Jungmann is a *Popular Socialist Party* member,⁶⁴ which participates in São Paulo Forum.⁶⁵ There is continuity indeed, since the *Communist Party of Brazil*, from which Aldo Rebelo (Jungman's predecessor) is a member of, also participates in São Paulo Forum. Jaques Wagner, Rebelo's predecessor, is a member of the *Worker's Party*, which was one of the founding parties of São Paulo Forum back in 1990.

Putting a solid geopolitical continuity at the top, the empirical facts fit in the puzzle of a logical explanation and support the crucial argument that, under a leftist ideological guideline, the South American integration maneuver has constituted the priority in Brazilian foreign policy, to the detriment of Brazil's national defense.

Conclusion

The particular way in which the foreign policy executive perceives the world—and concretely the space (i.e., territory) it is in charge of—shapes states' foreign policy outcomes. One of the main points of this paper was to put light on the *experience/ perception* that Brazilian *élites* (i.e., the *foreign policy executive*), have concerning the geographical setting's incentives of their country—the latter included in the relative material state potential, added to the systemic constraints.

The paper assessed that that experience or perception [*Raumsinn*] has been *geomisguided*, something that can be explained by the empirical existence of an international-leftist agenda in South America, namely identifiable within the political structure of São Paulo Forum. The results of the research, namely the data retrieved directly from governmental sources, show that the strengthening of the South American integration maneuver has been the priority to the Brazilian foreign policy executive, in other words, it has constituted the priority in terms of geopolitical design.

In this context, it was explained that, although the study demonstrated that the relative material state potential of Brazil has been fairly high and that the systemic constraints have been permissive to changes on the international chessboard, Brazilian *élites* have been pursuing a geoconjunctive maneuver that can be assessed as one against Brazil's national interests. The argument of damaging the national interests can be sustained by a set of facts that can be resumed in two dimensions. First, Brazil has been accumulating state's failures for years (security, political, economic). Second, previous research demonstrated that the preference for *land power* (continentalization) over *sea power* (maritimization) intensifies the causes of state's failures.

In terms of international alignment, the situation of Brazil is transitory, therefore contradictory. It includes (1) the particular fact that the strongest of Brazil's formal allies is still the U.S.A. (Rio Pact, 1948). However, (2) Brazil integrates the UNASUL and the Council of South American Defense, which consolidates the South American regional defense (excluding North America) and, furthermore, intends to approach the Russian-Chinese axis.

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12. The U.S. Energy Information Administration, “International,” <https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=BRA>, last modified May 2016.

13. Brazil signed a Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1998.

14. Agência Senado, “Projeto proíbe construção de usinas nucleares pelos próximos 30 anos—Brasil tem duas usinas em atividade e outra em construção, todas no Rio de Janeiro,” *UOL*, <http://jconline.ne10.uol.com.br/canal/politica/nacional/noticia/2017/07/31/projeto-proibe-construcao-de-usinas-nucleares-pelos-proximos-30-anos-298436.php>, last modified October 2017.

15. CIA, “Brazil,” *The World Factbook*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html>, last modified June 2016.

16. Encyclopedia of the Nations, “Brazil—Agriculture,” *Encyclopedia of the Nations*, <http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Americas/Brazil-AGRICULTURE.html>, last modified October 2017.

17. World Bank, “Gross Domestic Product 2014,” *World Development Indicators database*, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf>, last modified May 2016.

18. The Heritage Foundation, “2016 Index of Economic Freedom,” *Index of Economic Freedom—Country Ranking*, <http://www.heritage.org/index/ranking>, last modified June 2016.

19. CIA, “Brazil,” *The World Factbook*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html>, last modified June 2016.

20. That would be the reason why Brazilians have been voting/supporting socialist and communist parties for decades, although they are mostly Christians. However, currently, the situation seems to be changing with the popular revolts against the regime in 2015.

21. Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2015,” <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015#results-table>, last modified May 2016.

22. For specific cases of placing “Workers” Party members, supporters, militants in public structures *vide*: Morgado, 2016.

23. The Soft Power 30, “Index Results,” <http://softpower30.portland-communications.com/ranking/>, last modified June 2016.

24. Homicide Monitor, “Brazil,” <http://homicide.igarape.org.br/>, last modified June 2016.

25. The case of former Secretary for Human Rights Maria do Rosário provides strong empirical support for this claim. For example, Rosário’s public defense of criminals—Syl Polanski, “Jovem fica tetraplégico após assalto e Maria do Rosário vai na TV defender o criminoso,” *Blastingnews*, <http://br.blastingnews.com/sociedade-opinioao/2016/06/jovem-fica-tetraplegico-apos-assalto-e-maria-do-rosario-vai-na-tv-defender-o-criminoso-00985933.html>, last modified June 2016.

26. This object will be taken care of in another paper. However, some data on the topic is given in the next footnote.

27. In regard to corruption, the same progressive left that constitutes the ideological spectrum of both São Paulo Forum and the Meridionalist strategy has been denounced in consecutive corruption scandals, in which thousands of millions of R\$ were either stolen by leftist state's officials, or spent in other São Paulo Forum fellow member, or other given to communist countries such as Angola. The events are integrated onto a thick net—Mídia livre FCS, “Lava-Jato revela que dinheiro desviado da Petrobras também foi para Cuba, Argentina e outros,” Mídia livre FCS, <http://folhacentrosul.com.br/post-politica/7443/lava-jato-revela-que-dinheiro-desviado-da-petrobras-tambem-foi-para-cuba-argentina-e-outros>, last modified July 2016.

It should be kept in mind that the progressive leftist representatives have been accusing “neoliberalism” of having caused economic problems in the 90s. However, it should be also added that there was no capitalism in Latin America during that period, because “privatization” was not accompanied by “liberalization,” since those agents who bought states’ property remained attached to the state—in the same line of 90s’ Russia. Therefore, the true crisis is now arriving, clearly linked to corruption scandals fomented by the leftist executive officials during the last decades.

As for the relations between the *Workers’ Party* administration and drug-trafficking, it is important to remind:

- (i) São Paulo Forum, which was created by Lula’s *Workers’ Party* and Castro’s *Cuban Communist Party*, received Colombian *guerrilha* representatives in its meetings (*vide*: the minutes of *Foro de São Paulo*—Compilação das Atas do Foro de São Paulo, “Atas do Foro de São Paulo,” *Mídia Sem Máscara*, http://www.midiasemmascara.org/attachments/007_atas_foro_sao_paulo.pdf, last modified October 2016; and Raúl Reyes, a Member of FARC Central High Command killed in 2008, was one of the agents making the bridge between FARC and São Paulo Forum, as the São Paulo Forum’s newspaper *América Libre* informed—Claudia Korol, “El pueblo en armas, entrevista a Raúl Reyes, miembro del secretariado nacional de las FARC-EP,” <http://www.nodo50.org/americalibre/antiores/10/>, last modified August 2015. In order to understand FARC’s quest for political legitimization and the role of *Workers’ Party* in that process *vide*: Colonel Luis Alberto Villamarín Pulido, “A camarada e compatriota Dilma Rousseff é a tábua de salvação política das FARC,” *Conflicto Colombiano e Historia de Colombia*, <http://www.luisvillamarin.com/articulos/portugues/411-a-camarada-e-compatriota-dilma-rousseff-e-a-tabua-de-salvacao-politica-das-farc.html>, last modified July 2015; and General Marco Antonio Felício da Silva, “O PT, as FARC e o crime organizado,” *Inconfidência*, http://www.grupoinconfidencia.org.br/sistema/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2222:o-pt-as-farc-e-o-crime-organizado&catid=284:marco-antonio-felicio-da-silva&Itemid=426, last modified November 26, 2015.
- (ii) Not only FARC participated in São Paulo Forum meetings, but also the resolutions of the 10th São Paulo Forum congress in Havana constitute evidence of the support given by São Paulo Forum to FARC—Compilação das Atas do Foro de São Paulo, “Atas do Foro de São Paulo,” *Mídia Sem Máscara*, https://s3.amazonaws.com/midiasemmascara/site/uploads/resolucoes_do_foro_sao_paulo.pdf, last modified December 2008.

In addition, there is another very important document on this matter, a letter sent by FARC to São Paulo Forum in 2007. In this document, among valuable data, it is noteworthy that: (1) FARC thanked the *Workers’ Party* for having saved the revolutionary socialist movement in South America, and (2) FARC claimed that the coming to power of leftist officials in South American countries was an outcome of São Paulo Forum influence—Fuerzas Armada Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, “Saludo Mesa directiva del Foro de Sao Paulo,” *FARC-EP*, <http://web.archive.org/web/20070310215800/www.farcep.org/?node=2,2513,1>, last modified January 2007.

- (iii) Already in 2013, the FARC controlled the majority of the illegal drug trade in Colombia—Helen Murphy and Luís Jaime Acosta, “FARC controls 60 percent of drug trade—Colombia’s police chief,” *Reuters*, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-colombia-rebels-police-idUKBRE93L18Y20130422>, last modified April 2013.

28. CEBRAP, “Institucional,” <http://cebrap.org.br/v3/index.php?r=institucionais/index>, last modified June 2016.

Gustavo Henrique Lopes Machado, "PT versus PSDB: em que consiste o antagonismo?," *Diário da Liberdade*, <http://www.diarioliberalidade.org/opiniom/opiniom-propia/31507-pt-versus-psdb-em-que-consiste-o-antagonismo.html>, last modified September 2012.

UOL, "O laboratório de FHC," <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/mais/fs15089914.htm>, last modified August 2016.

29. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "A luta de PT e PSDB é política, não ideológica," Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira, <http://www.psdb.org.br/acompanhe/noticias/a-luta-de-pt-e-psdb-e-politica-nao-ideologica/>, last modified November 2004.

30. For example: Álvaro Bianchi, "Dossiê 'Gramsci e a Política' Apresentação," *Revista de Sociologia Política* no. 29 (November 2007), p. 8.

31. Artur Scavone, "Marilena Chauí no ato contra o golpe," *YouTube*, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GbTB51BS89A&spfreload=5>, last modified December 2015.

32. Global Firepower, "Countries Ranked by Military Strength (2016)," Global Firepower, <http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp>, last modified June 2016.

33. The expense is concentrated in 75.3 percent to pay salaries. Therefore, the investments to develop the Armed Forces are extremely reduced—Ministério da Defesa, *Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional* (Brasília: Ministério da Defesa, 2012), p. 227.

34. SIPRI, "Arms Trade," http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_values.php, last modified April 2016.

35. Index of National Power, "Index Comparisons," <http://www.nationalpower.info/index-of-national-power/comparing-nations-using-different-power-indecies/>, last modified June 2016.

It is also important to remind about the Brazilian Alcantara Cyclone Space project.

36. Transl.—"to establish a leftist strategy for action in Latin America"—Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, "Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, no encerramento do Encontro de Governadores da Frente Norte do Mercosul," last modified December 2007, Presidência da República, <http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/presidencia/ex-presidentes/luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva/discursos/2o-mandato/2007/06-12-2007-discurso-do-presidente-da-republica-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-no-encerramento-do-encontro-de-governadores-da-frente-norte-do-merc-sul>, p. 2.

37. Paulo Roberto de Almeida, "Do lulopetismo diplomático a uma política externa profissional," *Academia.edu*, https://www.academia.edu/25639710/Do_lulopetismo_diplomatico_a_uma_politica_externa_profissional, p. 5.

38. That conclusion finds convergence with arguments supported by Malamud and Paula Castanho e Silva too. *Vide*: Andres Malamud, "A Leader Without Followers? The Growing Divergence Between Regional and Global Performance of Brazilian Foreign Policy," *Latin American Politics and Society*, 53(3) (2011), p. 7, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2011.00123.x>.

Bruno de Paula Castanho e Silva, "The São Paulo Forum and the Development of Latin American Regional Integration," in 22nd IPSA World Congress of Political Science, Madrid, Spain, 2012, http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_11763.pdf.

39. Chandler supports this same perspective too—Robert Chandler, *Shadow World—Resurgent Russia, the Global New Left, and Radical Islam* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2008).

40. Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, "Decreto de 15 de Abril de 2005," *Presidência da República*, http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2004-2006/2005/Dnn/Dnn10495.htm, last modified April 2005.

41. Bruna Carvalho, "Raposa Serra do Sol: Índios vivem melhor em terra demarcada, mas Estado segue ausente," <https://www.cartacapital.com.br/sociedade/apos-4-anos-demarcacao-da-raposa-serra-do-sol-foi-positiva-mas-falta-presenca-do-estado-6230.html>, last modified December 2013.

42. "Lamentável, para não dizer caótica"—Leandro Prazeres, "General que criticou política indígena deixa comando da Amazônia e evita falar sobre Raposa/Serra do Sol," UOL, <https://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/2009/03/23/ult5773u873.jhtm>, last modified March 2009.

43. Portal Brasil, "Brasil demarca quase 14 milhões de hectares como terra indígena em 10 anos," <http://www.brasil.gov.br/cidadania-e-justica/2015/10/brasil-demarca-quase-14-milhoes-de-hectares-como-terra-indigena-em-10-anos>, last modified October 2015.

44. Robert M. Clark, *Intelligence Analysis—A Target-Centric Approach* (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2013), p. 94.
45. Implicante, “Lula confessa ter dado aval para Evo Morales tomar para a Bolívia as refinarias da Petrobras,” <http://www.implicante.org/blog/lula-confessa-ter-dado-aval-para-evo-morales-tomar-para-a-bolivia-as-refinarias-da-petrobras/>, last modified October 2015.
46. Fabiano Maisonnave, “Petrobras perdeu R\$ 872 mi com acordo imposto por Lula,” *Folha de São Paulo*, <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2015/05/1623475-petrobras-perdeu-r-872-mi-com-acordo-imposto-por-lula.shtml>, last modified October 2017.
47. Uol Economia, “Petrobras volta a investir na Bolívia 7 anos após ‘perder’ refinarias no país, diz jornal,” <http://economia.uol.com.br/noticias/redacao/2013/02/01/petrobras-volta-investir-na-bolivia-sete-anos-apos-estatizacao.htm>, last modified February 2013.
48. Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, “Lei nº 12.189, de 12 de Janeiro de 2010,” *Presidência da República*, http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2007-2010/2010/lei/L12189.htm, last modified January 2010.
49. The topic of the leftist hegemony in Brazilian politics and culture, as well as the topic of the constraint of the international-leftist solidarity in South America, will be developed in another research project. For basic readings, *vide*: Olavo de Carvalho, *A Nova Era e a Revolução Cultural* (Vide: São Paulo, 2014); José Fábrega, “Gramsci e a Estratégia atual das esquerdas,” *Inconfidência*, http://www.grupoinconfidencia.org.br/sistema/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=129:gramsci-e-a-estrategia-atual-das-esquerdas&catid=93:artigos-classicos&Itemid=86, last modified August 2015; S.A. A. Coutinho, *A Revolução Gramscista no Ocidente* (Estandarte: Rio de Janeiro, 2002); S.A. A. Coutinho, *Cadernos da Liberdade—uma visão do mundo diferente do senso comum modificado* (Grupo Inconfidência: Belo Horizonte, 2003); and Heitor de Paola, *O Eixo do Mal Latino-americano—e a Nova Ordem Mundial* (É Realizações: São Paulo, 2008).
50. Instituto Lula, “Lula reafirma importância das relações com América Latina e África,” *YouTube*, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IRHrUrWW070>, last modified October 2014.
51. Canal Verde Amarelo, “Michel Temer confirma que dará continuidade aos planos do Foro de São Paulo,” *YouTube*, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J9x6pulpHC0>, last modified October 2016.
52. Taliaferro, 2006, p. 467.
53. The incentive for a *seapower* grand strategy is the result of past research: Morgado, 2016.
54. Ministério da Defesa, *Política Nacional de Defesa & Estratégia Nacional de Defesa* (Brasília: Ministério da Defesa, 2012), p. 17.
55. *Ibid.*, pp. 21–27.
56. *Ibid.*, pp. 31, 54.
57. *Ibid.*, pp. 58–59.
58. E.g., Carlos de Meira Mattos, *Uma Geopolítica Pan-Amazônica* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1980), p. 161.
59. Ministério da Defesa, 2012, p. 365.
60. *Ibid.*, pp. 37–38.
61. “Geoconjunctive process” was a classification created by the author in order to designate cooperative modalities of action among political actors in the domain of “applied geopolitics.”
62. The Rio Pact or the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance is a military alliance, still in force, between the majority of the countries in the Americas signed in 1947.
63. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Brazil,” U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35640.htm>, last modified July 2015.
64. Raul Jungmann, “Partido,” Raul Jungmann, <http://www.rauljungmann.com.br/>, last modified June 2016.
65. Foro de São Paulo, “Partidos,” *Foro de São Paulo*, <http://forodesaopaulo.org/partidos/>, last modified June 2016.

An earlier version of this paper was presented at at the seminar Los procesos políticos, sociales y económicos en Argentina y Brasil reciente,

which took place on the February 2, 2017, at the Faculty of Political Science, University Maria Curie Skłodowska in Lublin, Poland. A.M.D.G.

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