Peace as the Absence of Militarized Conflict: Comparing the Democratic and Territorial Peace

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Abstract

Peace has mostly been defined in terms of the absence of war. In this study we define peace between two countries as never resorting to the threat or use of militarized force. In technical terms, peace is neither side ever having a militarized interstate dispute (MID) with the other. This study tests two propositions. The first is that MID-free dyads consist of states that do not have territorial claims. The second is the democratic peace claim that MID-free dyads are those consisting of joint democracies. The relative impact of the territorial peace and democratic peace hypotheses are assessed. Based on the territorial explanation of war it is predicted that the first proposition will account for more cases of peace than the second proposition (on democracy). It is also predicted that a main reason joint democracies might be MID free is that they do not have territorial issues in the first place. This is due to the fact they have settled their border and territorial issues with their neighbors *before* they become joint democracies. All politically relevant dyads are compared on the basis of those that have never had a MID with those that have had at least one. The analysis is conducted on the 1946-1989 and 1990-2001 periods.

THE THEORETICAL APPROACH

The causes of war are an intricate labyrinth of issues and conflict. However, out of all sources of severe conflict, the territorial explanation of war contends issues over territory are the most apt to lead to war (Vasquez 1993, chapter 4). Research on interstate conflict from 1816-2001 shows territorial disputes having a higher probability of escalation to war than other kinds of disputes (Vasquez 1993, chapter 4; Hensel 1996; Senese 1996; Vasquez and Henehan 2001; Hensel 2000; Senese 2005; Senese & Vasquez 2003, 2008). The territorial explanation of war additionally states that resolving this kind of contentious issue removes a significant cause of war. The territorial explanation contends that settling these types of issues allows states to remain peaceful with one another, even if other salient issues arise. Vasquez (1993, 146) argues: "If the territorial divisions among neighbors are not challenged but accepted as legitimate, peaceful relations can govern. Most borders once satisfactorily settled remain so for long periods of time."

The logic here is that the settlement of borders and related territorial claims eliminates one of the most war prone issues from the agenda of a pair of states. Such issues increase the probability of war and act like a sufficient condition, not a necessary condition. Dyads can still fight over other non-territorial issues and they do. Vasquez & Valierano (2010) for instance find that while territorial wars were the most prevalent from 1816-2007 and that wars over territory between neighbors are the modal war in the system, there are still many policy and regime wars—i.e. wars that arise from policy or regime MIDs.

Nonetheless, as Hensel (2006) points out territorial issues tend to be special; they not only increase the probability of conflict, but they poison the entire relationship between states. Removing them not only eliminates a very war-prone issue, but it reduces overall hostility so that other issues can be approached in a more reasonable manner. Hensel finds that resolving a territorial claim not only reduces the likelihood of having a territorial MID, but *any* MID. Likewise, Senese & Vasquez (2003) using a two-stage model find that absence of a territorial claim reduces the likelihood of any MID, while conversely the presence of a territorial claim increases the likelihood of any MID (not just a territorial MID).

This territorial explanation regarding the conditions of peace is the major theoretical difference between the territorial explanation of war and realism. The latter sees war as an inherent struggle for power resulting from systemic anarchy. The territorial explanation is more optimistic and contends that if neighbouring states accept their territorial borders, they can live in peace. The settling of territorial disputes and the establishment of legitimate borders creates a strong source of peace.

Because territorial issues have such a high probability of war removing them should leave a clear trace in the historical record. If one were to look at peaceful dyads in history, one would expect that a large number would not have any territorial disputes (Vasquez 2001, 164, Vasquez 2009, 365), even though territorial issues are not a necessary condition of war. The reasoning for this is a significant and contentious issue is removed from the agenda.

Early research on borders provides evidence that the acceptance of borders leads to peace among neighbors. Kocs (1995) maintains that states that legally accept their borders are less likely to have a war. He finds this to be the case in the data he created for the post-World War II period. Owsiak (2012) further supports this hypothesis with a more precise measure when investigating the entire 1816-2001 period. Gibler (2007) has similar findings based on the presence of stable borders. These findings imply that states with established borders will have fewer continuing territorial claims. Gibler (2007) also argues that stable borders allow for both peaceful relations between states and a fertile environment for the emergence of democracy (see also Hutchison & Gibler 2007). Additionally, Gibler & Tir (2010) find demilitarization derives from settled borders established during a peaceful transfer, which enhances the possibilities for democracy (see also Tir 2003). The association between established borders and peace offers a deeper explanation of the cause and sustainability of peace within the world. These findings and analyses provide an alternative explanation to the democratic peace (see Gibler 2007). For this reason they are referred to as the territorial peace (Gibler 2012).[1]

Some of Gibler's findings corroborate a broad study conducted by Rasler & Thompson (2010, 2011, see also Rasler & Thompson, 2014). They use data from Biger (1995) and find that peaceful relations are more common in areas with settled borders. Additionally, they find democracy is associated with settled borders. Ultimately, all of these studies find that war dramatically decreases when borders are accepted between neighbouring states.

Another study that tests the territorial explanation of war is Henehan & Vasquez (2006). This study shows that periods of history with no wars between major states have few or no territorial militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). This study shows that the absence of war is associated not only with dyads that do not have territorial disputes, but that peaceful periods of history where there are no wars among major states is associated with the absence of territorial disputes. Both these results support the theoretical expectations of the territorial peace.

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1   On Gibler's original (2007) see the exchange between Park & Colaresi (2014) and Gibler (2014).

Again note, it is not that the absence of territorial disputes is a necessary condition of peaceful periods, but just that they are associated with them.

Finally, Vasquez (2014) made a direct comparison of the territorial peace and the democratic peace by examining all peaceful dyads that have never fought a war, but have had at least one militarized interstate dispute (MID). The results show that dyads that did not have territorial disputes accounted for just over 80% of the peaceful dyads while joint democracy only accounted for about 7% of the peaceful dyads depending on the time period. This sort of finding shows that peace can be associated with both the absence of territorial disputes and the presence of democracy. Both of these as sufficient conditions of peace are not logically contradictory.

However Vasquez (2014) also found that around 90% of the peaceful democratic dyads also never had a territorial dispute, which suggests that the reason joint democracies do not go to war is that they do not have territorial issues.[2] This latter finding does imply that the territorial peace is a more powerful analysis of peace than the democratic peace because it can account for why democracies do not fight on the basis of its own logic.

Some argue, however, that the reason joint democratic states do not have territorial disputes is that their regime type helps prevent any territorial issues from escalating to the use of force, i.e. from becoming MIDs. Proponents of the territorial explanation have countered that the actual reason democratic states do not have territorial MIDs is due to the settlement of their borders before they are an established democratic state. What this means is that while the state was a "non-joint democratic dyad" they resolved this very dangerous issue. Owsiak & Vasquez (2013) test this claim and find that about 90% of neighbours accepted their mutual borders before they became democracies.

All of the above research is focused on war with peace defined as the absence of war. Some have argued that true peace, or at least a deeper peace, is the absence of any resort to the use of militarized force whatsoever. Some of the early findings on the democratic peace (e.g. Huth & Allee 2002) suggest that one of the reasons democracies may not fight is that they tend not to have many MIDs. Reed (2000) in testing a selection model also finds joint democracies have fewer MIDs than non-joint democracies and that this may be a reason for the absence of war between them. A criticism of Vasquez's (2014) research is that the absence of war is not as good an indicator of peace as the absence of MIDs is. Since joint democracies have fewer MIDs, regime type might still be a better predictor of peace than

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2   Roughly the same is true of non-joint democracies that are MID free. This means that regime type is not the key for predicting why dyads do not resort to militarized force. They do not use militarized force because they are not contending over territorial issues.

territory. In addition, early tests of the democratic peace, like Maoz & Russett (1993) used the number of MIDs or crises (measured by ICB data)[3] as a test of the democratic peace.

It must be pointed out, however, that such a claim shifts the dependent variable in most of the literature from the absence of war to the absence of MIDs (i.e. from war onset to MID onset). The territorial explanation in its original formulation (Vasquez 1993, chapter 4; see also Vasquez 1995) did not address peace in terms of the absence of all militarized conflict. Nonetheless, the logic of the explanation can be used to deduce hypotheses with this dependent variable. Since territory is a sensitive issue, it is expected theoretically that states with a territorial issue in the first place would be more likely to have a territorial MID. Territorial issues however are so salient that they can poison a relationship and thereby encourage the resort to force and the emergence of any sort of MID, even if the dispute is not over territory (Senese & Vasquez 2003). From the territorial perspective, dyads that are MID free are those that do not have territorial issues. As for dyads that resort to the use of (militarized) force, they are more likely to have territorial issues. The implication of this explanation is that only certain types of issues are worth the risk and costs of war. Once these issues are off the agenda there may be no reason to go to war or even use militarized force. Grievances are at the heart of conflict, and the more salient the grievances, the more costs, including blood costs, an actor is willing to accept.

There are numerous factors, which contribute to the salience of grievances, but in order to understand territory's role within contentious issues it is important to know how its underlying dimensions cause conflict to occur in a given issue. An aspect of territory, which is key to understanding its full complexity, involves the concepts of tangibility and intangibility (Hensel & Mitchell 2005). Tangible objects are concrete items such as terrain, natural resources, and trade routes. Intangibility is a value assigned to an object that is not visible and involves a certain set of values, beliefs or symbols that are an item, place or set of people (see Barrett 2011). Hensel & Mitchell (2005) find territorial claims imbedded with intangible values (like ethnic concerns) are more apt to give rise to a MID than those without intangible characteristics (see also Hensel et al. 2008). Barrett (2011) finds that the combination of High Tangibility and High Intangibility in a territorial claim greatly increases the chance of the occurrence of MIDs. Therefore, settling territorial issues dramatically decreases the chance of militarized conflict because states

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3 ICB stands for the International Crisis Behavior project (see Brecher & Wilkenfeld 1997). It should be noted that when Maoz and Russett used ICB as a dependent variable there was no statistically significant relationship between joint democracy and a low level of conflict.

are resolving both tangible and intangible issues at hand.

This logic is very different from the democratic peace, which emphasizes the tendency of joint democracies dealing with their disagreements cooperatively. The normative explanation of the democratic peace, in particular, emphasizes the use of non-violent bargaining and negotiation or even mediation over the use of force between democracies. This logic is sufficiently different from the territorial explanation. This allows one to set up a crucial test between the two factors, with the democratic peace predicting that regime type is the key to peace and the territorial peace predicting that the issue is the key to peace. In this analysis we will see if the logic of these two different explanations of peace can account for not just the absence of war, but the absence of any kind of militarized conflict.

While there have been some studies on MID onset (e.g. Kinsella & Russett 2002) there have not been any on why some dyads never resort to the use of force. Even the democratic peace, which sometimes examines the frequency of MIDs, (Russett & Oneal 2001) does not explicitly investigate the complete absence of MIDs as a dependent variable. This would involve treating the dependent variable as dichotomous (yes/no) rather than as a continuous frequency of MIDs. Nonetheless, the logic of both the democratic peace and the territorial peace make it easy to derive a clear set of hypotheses as to what is the source of a dyad free of force.

For the democratic peace the place to begin is Deutsch's (1957) concept of a security community. Contrary to realists, who posit a constant struggle for power and periodic war, Deutsch posed the possibility of a community of nation-states where war is not conceivable. Even though some of the states that would not consider going to war but might consider using force, at least some of the logic that would make war unthinkable might cross over and make the use of force unlikely as well. For the democratic peace, these factors are the same as outlined in the normative and structural explanations (see Maoz & Russett 1993); namely, the presence of norms that encourage negotiations and non-violent behaviour between joint democracies, or domestic structures that restrain leaders from using force.[4]

Having outlined the different logics of the two explanations, we now derive some testable hypotheses from the two.

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[4]   In many ways a more nuanced explanation of the democratic peace than the normative or structural explanations of Maoz & Russett (1993) is that of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999, 2003). For our tests we do not need to take account of these different theoretical analysis because the basic prediction we make that peaceful dyads are associated with joint democracy would be made by all three.

HYPOTHESES

For the purpose of this analysis peaceful dyads are defined not only as dyads that are free of war, but dyads that have never threatened or used military force against each other. In data terms, we define peaceful dyads as those that are MID free. This analysis will identify dyads that have no MIDs and test two explanations of why they do not have any MIDs.

Four hypotheses will be tested to see whether the territorial peace or the democratic peace better predicts the absence of militarize force between states. The territorial peace predicts that peaceful (MID-free dyads) are those who do not have territorial issues; i.e. those who do not have outstanding territorial claims against each other. The rationale for this hypothesis is that dyads that do not contend over highly salient issues will be less willing to use militarized force. This occurs because non-territorial issues are not typically worth these sorts of costs. Of course, this rationale is probabilistic since territorial disputes, although more likely to go to war, are not a necessary conditions of war. Likewise, territorial issues are not a necessary condition of the use of force, even though they are more likely to give rise to the threat or use of force. This analysis gives rise to Hypothesis 1.

Hypothesis 1: Peaceful dyads (i.e. those that are MID free) should consist predominantly of dyads that do not have territorial issues (claims).

The democratic peace predicts that the use of force is not a function of the issue under contention, but the predilection of regimes to handle an issue in certain ways. For the democratic peace, joint democracies are considerably less likely to use militarized force against each other regardless of the issue under contention. The rationale is that joint democracies due to either the norms that guide their behaviour or because of domestic structural constraints (Maoz & Russett 1993) have a much lower probability of employing force against each other. From these theoretical expectations Hypothesis 2 can be derived.

Hypothesis 2: Peaceful dyads (i.e. those that are MID free) should consist predominantly of joint democracies.

The above two hypotheses compare the predictions of the territorial peace with those of the democratic peace. As they stand even if they both pass testing, the results do not mean that one explanation is more powerful than the other. They both could be complementary even. The last two hypotheses are more evaluative. Hypothesis 3 says that the territorial peace is more useful because it can successfully predict more cases of peace. Hypothesis 4 goes further and implies that the territorial explanation is more powerful because it can explain why joint democracies do not fight.

The third hypothesis provides a comparative test between the two explana-

tions. It posits that dyads without territorial claims will account for more peaceful (MID-free) dyads than joint democratic dyads. It is assumed that comparing the % of successful predictions of each explanation provides an empirical way of determining which explanation can better predict which dyads are peaceful. In other terms, we want to know what % of a population or sample of peaceful dyads are consistent with the theoretical expectations of the two explanations. If a joint democracy only makes up a low percentage of "MID free" dyads, then other factors are contributing to a larger percentage.

Hypothesis 3: When territorial claims are absent from a claim, it will correctly predict more instances (and an increased percentage) of peaceful dyads compared to joint democracy.

Hypothesis 4 goes a step further and posits that the very reason a joint democracies are MID free is that they do not have territorial claims against each other. The reasoning here is that joint democracies are peaceful because they do not raise life and death issues with each other, which differs from the notion that they can handle the issues better because of who they are. This implication is that territorial issues will be absent from a significant portion of jointly democratic peaceful dyads. This hypothesis will permit us to see if the absence of territorial disagreement is a contributing factor as to why joint democracies are free of militarized conflict. This gives rise to Hypothesis 4.

Hypothesis 4: Joint democracies that are MID free will have few territorial claims.

The tests of Hypothesis 4 will also examine non-joint democracies to see how many of these peaceful (MID-free) dyads are also free of territorial claims. If the non-joint democracies are also generally free of territorial claims this will indicate that territory or issue type is more important than regime type.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Dependent Variable

This study seeks to identify peaceful dyads that never use or even threaten the use of force against each other in a given historical period.[5] This study examines the reasoning as to why this is the case by testing two explanations of peace in the literature—the territorial peace and the democratic peace. Investigating why states never use force against each other would be a monumental task if data on

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5   Maoz (2004) is one of the few who does that for dyads that never go to war with each other.

militarized conflict did not already exist. The MID project of the Correlates of War project back in the 1970s began to collect data on every threat or use of militarized force among legally recognized nation-states from 1816 on (Wallace 1972; Gochman & Maoz 1984). The MID 3.1 data which goes through 2001 (Jones, Bremer & Singer 1996; Ghosn, Palmer & Bremer 2004) will be used as the basis of all tests. These data record which states had MIDs and against whom. These data will be re-configured to look at the history of MIDs between each dyad in the system. The larger project (Vasquez 2014), of which this is a part, does this for the full period, but the data are also divided into three historical periods: 1816-1945, 1946-1989, and 1990-2001. This adds to the robustness of the test because these periods are historically quite different and it would be possible for certain dyads to be MID free in one period but not another. Across the three time periods there are 951 dyads that have at least one MID. Because of the dearth of joint democracies in the 1816-1945 period only two time periods—1946-1989 and 1990-2001 will be analysed here.

Case Selection

To get at the cases that are MID free it is necessary to compare the list of dyads with at least one MID to a list of all the dyads in the system. One problem with this procedure is that some of the cases will be at peace simply because they have no contact and hence no disagreements. A true sample of peaceful dyads must have the opportunity of the risk of conflict—therefore we look only at politically relevant dyads (Lemke & Reed 2001).[6] Thus, this study will include dyads that are contiguous (by land and sea) since 1816 or their entry into the state system and all dyads between a major and minor state. There were 1,231 dyads that were found to be dyad-free from 1816-2001 and these were attached to the sample of 951 dyads that had at least 1 MID. The latter includes all dyads that have at least one MID at any time from 1816-2001. This means that if a dyad had a MID in 1816-1945 it still appears in the post-World War II samples even if it had no MID in that period.

The Data

To properly test the hypotheses under study data on the history of dyads, as op-

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6   For some of the limits of a politically relevant sample, see Maoz (1996). He finds that some non-contiguous dyads between minor states still have wars and MIDs and thus clearly violate the assumption that non-politically relevant cases do not have severe conflict. These dyads are mostly in the Middle East and Persian Gulf (e.g. Iraq/Iran vs. Israel). We only use a politically relevant sample to identify states with NO MIDs so our analysis is not severely affected by this problem of missing MIDs.

posed to individual disputes, must be collected. For instance, we are interested in Franco-German dyad and whether it ever had a MID; i.e. if it was free of militarized conflict for a period of time. To increase our understanding we collect a "dyad history" data set. These data have one observation for each dyad in a given historical period. It records:

- Whether the pair of states in the dyad ever had a MID
- The number of MIDs the dyad has
- The number of territorial MIDs
- Whether they were always democracies in a given period

These data are quite different from the typical dyadic dispute data that are widely employed. Our data has one observation for every dyad. Dyadic dispute data has one observation for each MID and thus multiple observations for all dyads that have more than one MID from 1816-2001. Dyadic dispute data do not compare dyads to each other, but MIDs. Our data differ even more from dyad-year data, which despite the name does not compare dyads either. It compares the presence of MIDs in a given year. Dyad-year data, although they tell us if in a given year whether a dyad is MID free, cannot be used to compare a dyad that has *never* had a MID in its history (for a given period) with those that have. Vasquez & Leskiw (2001) first implemented dyad history data to study and compare rivals. Subsequently, it was used by Henehan & Vasquez (2001), and Senese & Vasquez (2008). It is also the kind of approach taken by those who compare rivals with non-rivals (Diehl & Goertz 2000; Klein et al. 2006; Thompson 2001)

One problem with dyad history data is: how does one determine when a dyad changes? When do changes in a country warrant the creation of a new dyad? The operational rule used here is that when the Correlates of War project recognized the existence of a new country (e.g. East and West Germany replacing Germany) then a new dyad is created in the data set.

Independent Variables

There are two main independent variables, one to test the territorial peace claim and one to test the democratic peace. To see if states have territorial issues we use the Huth & Allee (2002) data, which looks at whether a state has made a territorial claim against another state.[7] We use this as dyadic data (i.e. one state makes a specific claim on another). Huth & Allee have two bits of data—whether a claim was made and whether it escalated to some use of force. We use only the first por-

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7   Huth (1996) refers to his data as territorial disputes. We change that to territorial claims so as not to confuse his data, which consists of claims whether or not they use militarized force, with the MID (militarized interstate *dispute*) data of the Correlates of War project.

tion of data. To determine whether it escalated to force we use the MID 3.1 data. Their data is then re-configured into our Dyad History data to record:

- The presence of territorial issues or claims in the dyad using the Huth & Allee data 1919-1995
- The number of territorial issues in the dyad in a given period

We then compare the dyads that have never had a territorial claim in a period with those that have had at least one. This makes for a main independent variable, which is whether a dyad has a territorial claim by one party against the other or has no territorial claims.

The second major independent variable is whether the dyad is a joint democracy or not. Policy IV data (Jaggers & Gurr 1995) is applied to make this determination. The "weak link" measure of Dixon (1993) is employed with a 6 or above to determine what is a democracy. The "weak link" score takes the lowest result within the dyad as determinative. Thus, if one side has a 6 and the other a 5, this is treated as a non-democratic dyad because the score of 5 for the one side does not reach the 6 cut-off.

To determine if a given dyad is a joint democracy, the policy scores were used to determine if the two countries were "always" a joint democracy in a given period or "ever" a joint democracy. Since we are comparing dyads that never had a MID to those with least one, it makes sense to use only the "always" joint democratic score. This way we know that for a given period the dyad is always free of MIDs and always a joint democracy.[8] A list of dyads that are always a joint democracy in a given period is provided in the appendix.

Test Design and Statistics

It is assumed that the absence of a disagreement pertaining to borders or other territorial questions would make for "MID free" dyads. Gibler (2007) states, stable borders have fewer MIDs between neighbours. To analyze the impact of joint democracy and the absence of territorial issues, two main questions will be asked: a) How many of "MID free" dyads are joint democracies and b) how many "MID free" dyads do not have territorial claims. As noted earlier, to confirm that the dyads that have no MIDs have the capability of severe conflict, a politically relevant sample is used.

A second test is also conducted to see if the lack of MIDs over conflict-prone issues (namely territorial) is a contributing factor to why joint democracies might

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8   If one used the "ever" a joint democracy it would be possible that the MID that occurred could have been during a time when the dyad was not a joint democracy and this would be an incorrect test of the hypothesis.

be MID free. In this test we examine the joint democracies that are MID free and see whether they have territorial claims. If most do not have territorial claims, this suggests that they do not resort to force because the issue under contention is not inherently prone to violence. To see if this is also true of non-democracies, we examine the non-joint democracies to see whether they have territorial claims. If the results show that joint democracies do not have many territorial claims, this implies the territorial peace can subsume the democratic peace because it can account for why joint democracies are peaceful.

All of the four hypotheses we examined can be tested by using 2x2 contingency tables with a chi-square significance test. We find the latter heuristically useful so we have reported it, even though the percentages and raw number make the results clear. We turn now to our findings.

FINDINGS

Tables 1-6 report the results. In these tests what we are asking, is if "MID free" dyads, i.e. those which never have a single resort to the threat or use of force, are more accounted for by the absence of territorial issues or by the presence of joint democracy. Findings for each of the different time periods are reported.

Table 1 reports the outcomes on the tests on the territorial peace. Since there is just one joint democracy in the 1816-1945 time period, only the Cold War and the Post-Cold periods are examined. During the 1946-1989 Cold War period there are 1068 dyads that never use force against each other and as can be seen in Table 1, 94% (1004/1068) of these dyads have no territorial claims against each other. This strongly implies that if dyads do not have territorial claims they are not likely to use military force against each other.[9]

There are similar findings for the Post-Cold War 1990-1995 period. Here about 91% (1557/1707) of the peaceful (MID-free) dyads have no territorial claims. Not having territorial issues with another state seems to be an excellent predictor of being free of militarized conflict and hence peaceful.[10]

The findings in Table 1 provide evidence highly consistent with Hypothesis 1. Dyads that are free of force tend to be those that do not have territorial claims

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9   Nonetheless, one can still be conflict free and have territorial claims, although this is rare. Only about 6% of the dyads that are peaceful have territorial claims.

10 As in the Cold War period about just 9% of the peaceful dyads have territorial claims and do not resort to force as a way of handling them. Why these dyads do not resort to force is an important area of future research.

Table 1. Tourism and Palestinian Suicide Attacks: Pooled (Palestine)-Level Regressions
         (Hypothesis 1)

A. 1946-1989	Territorial Claims (Huth & Allee)		
Any MID	No	Yes	Total
No MIDs	1,004	64	1,068
	(94.01%)	(6%)	
MIDs	333	129	462
	(72.08%)	(27.92%)	
Total	1,337	193	1,530

ChiSq(1)140.7 Pr.<.000

B. 1990-1995	Territorial Claims (Huth & Allee)		
Any MID	No	Yes	Total
No MIDs	1557	150	1,707
	(91.21%)	(8.79%)	
MIDs	218	71	289
	(75.43%)	(24.57%)	
Total	1,775	221	1,996

ChiSq(1)62.5 Pr.<.000

against each other. This supports the claims of the territorial peace. Over 90% of these MID-free cases are accounted for by the territorial peace. We turn now to how well the democratic peace does.

Table 2 looks at joint democracies and peaceful dyads. The top part of Table 2 examines the 1946-1989 Cold War period. There are 1068 MID-free dyads. Only about 7% of the MID-free dyads are jointly democratic. Thus of the 1068 MID-free dyads that never use force, only 74 are joint democracies. On the other hand 994 are non-joint democracies that never use force against each other either.

The results for the Cold War period also show that joint democracies are not likely to use force against each other. There are 82 joint democracies and around 90% (74/82) that never have a MID. However, it can also be seen that a large number of the non-joint democracies never use force against each other; about 2/3 do not resort to force (994/1448). While this is evidence that generally joint democracies are more peaceful, this also means that most politically relevant dyads in history do not use militarized force against each other. Peace is actually much more prevalent than one would expect from a realist analyses.[11]

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11 Morgenthau (1978, p.42) says: "All history shows that nations active in international politics are continuously preparing for, actively involved in, or recovering from organized violence in the form of war." (see also Mearshemier 2001).

Table 2. MID Free Dyads and the Presence of Joint Democracy

A. 1946-1989

Any MID	Non-Joint Democracies	Joint Democracies	Total
No MIDs	994	74	1,068
	(93.07%)	(6.93%)	
MIDs	454	8	462
	(98.27%)	(1.73%)	
Total	1,448	82	1,530

ChiSq(1)17.17 Pr.<0.000

B. 1990-2001

Any MID	Non-Joint Democracies	Joint Democracies	Total
No MIDs	1330	377	1,707
	(77.91%)	(22.09%)	
MIDs	272	17	289
	(94.12%)	(5.88%)	
Total	1,602	394	1,996

ChiSq(1)40.96 Pr.<0.000

The bottom part of Table 2 examines the Post-Cold War world; what is noticeable here is the great increase in democracies from 82 to 394. Many of these are young and have lasted barely a decade, if that. The increase in joint democracies makes for a higher percentage of the MID-free dyads that are accounted for by joint democracy going to 22%. Still this means that over 75% of the peaceful dyads are non-joint democracies.

In this period we see that about 95% (377/394) of the joint democracies do not use force against each other, which is up from 90% in the Cold War era. This is only comparatively more conflictive since 83% (1330/1602) of the non-joint democracies never use force against each other in the Post-Cold War period. Looked at from another way, roughly 4% (17/394) of the joint democracies are initiating MIDs against each other, compared to 17% (272/1602) of the non-joint democracies.

Nonetheless, on the whole these findings do not provide evidence consistent with Hypothesis 2. Joint democracy only accounts for 7% to 22% of the peaceful MID-free dyads. This means that roughly 93% to 78% of the "MID free" dyads consists of non-joint democracies. In light of the support for Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2 is rejected.

In terms of Hypothesis 3, it is seen that in fact the territorial peace accounts for more cases of peaceful MID-free dyads than the democratic peace. The territorial peace accounts for slightly over 90% of the peaceful cases in the two time

Table 3. How Many of the "MID Free Dyads That Are Joint Democracies Do Not Have a Huth & Allee Territorial Claim?

A. 1946-1989

A MID	Territorial Claims (Huth & Allee) Joint Dems Only		
	No	Yes	Total
No MIDs	65	9	74
	(87.84%)	(12.16%)	
MIDs	5	3	8
	(62.5%)	(37.50%)	
Total	70	12	82

ChiSq(1)3.71 Pr.<0.054

B. 1990-1995

A MID	Territorial Claims (Huth & Allee) Joint Dems Only		
	No	Yes	Total
No MIDs	318	59	377
	(84.35%)	(15.65%)	
MIDs	8	9	17
	(47.06%)	(52.94%)	
Total	326	68	394

ChiSq(1)15.84 Pr.<0.000

periods, while the democratic peace accounts only for 7%-22% of the cases depending on the time period. The % successful predictions of the territorial peace are overwhelming compared to the democratic peace. On this basis, Hypothesis 3 has passed testing. Regime type does not account for many of the cases of peace in history, but the type of issue under contention does.

We now turn to Hypothesis 4. Is it possible that the reason joint democracies are as peaceful as they are has to do with the issues over which they contend? Mitchell and Prins (1999) showed that democratic states tend to have mostly maritime and not territorial issues. Hypothesis 4 posits that most joint democracies actually will not have territorial issues. Table 3 looks at whether joint democracies are peaceful because they do not have territorial issues. The top part of the table examines the cases that are both joint democracies and MID free during the Cold War. There are 74 such cases. It can be seen that 65 (or 88%) of the cases do not have territorial claims. This supports the claim that democracies do not fight because they do not contend over territorial issue. The bottom part of this table examines the Post-Cold War period. Here there are 377 joint democracies that are MID free. About 84% (318/377) of these dyads have no territorial claims against each other. Again the findings show that conflict-free dyads are those that do not have territorial disagreements. This implies that the reason democracies do not fight each other is that they do not have serious issues that divide them.

Table 4. How Many of the "MID Free Dyads That Are *Non-Joint* Democracies Do Not Have a
          Huth & Allee Territorial Claim?

A. 1946-1989	Territorial Claims (Huth & Allee) Non-Joint Dems Only		
Any MID	Non-Terr. Claim	Terr. Claims	Total
No MIDs	939	55	994
	(94.47%)	(5.53%)	
MIDs	328	126	454
	(72.25%)	(27.75%)	
Total	1,267	181	1,448

ChiSq(1)140.69 Pr.<0.000

B. 1990-2001			
Any MID	Non-Terr. Claim	Terr. Claims	Total
No MIDs	1239	91	1330
	(93.16%)	(6.84%)	
MIDs	210	62	272
	(77.21%)	(22.79%)	
Total	1,449	153	1,602

ChiSq(1)66.52 Pr.<0.000

Table 4 tests Hypothesis 4 by examining—non-joint democracies that are MID-free. If the non-joint democracies are MID-free and do not have territorial issues, this suggests that regime type—whether it be democracy or non-democracies—is less important than territory. We see in the Cold War period there are 994 dyads that are MID-free and non-joint democracies. Of these about 95% have no territorial claims. For the Post-Cold War period the results are similar—93% of the 1330 peaceful conflict-free dyads do not have territorial claims. The fact that both joint-democracies and non-joint democracies that are MID free and do not contend over territory supports the territorial peace rather than the democratic peace. These results are clearly consistent with the theoretical expectations of the territorial peace and Hypothesis 4.

What is theoretically interesting in this analysis are the anomalies—those cases where joint democracies have territorial issues but do not resort to using force (Table 3). These cases if investigated might tell us something about how regime type helps avoid the use of force. In the Cold War there are 9 such cases (12% of 74 MID-free dyads). Some of these cases involve former territorial struggles, like Finland-Sweden, the UK-Ireland, Netherlands-Belgium, and Netherlands-Germany. Others are colonial in nature like Canada-UK, US-Netherlands, UK-Netherlands, and UK-Mauritius. Each will have to be investigated on their own merits to see what they can tell us about democracy and territorial issues. In the

Post-Cold War period there is a jump to 59 cases. Future case studies on these issues will reveal more about the role of regime characteristics that promote peace.

Table 4 also lists the cases of non-joint democracy that have territorial claims but do not resort to force. These are interesting because they show it is not only joint democracies that resist the use of force. In the Cold War there are 55 such cases and in the Post-Cold War 91—generally between 5-6%.

CONCLUSION

The four hypotheses tested in this study produce evidence that compares the relative potency of the territorial peace and the democratic peace. Although the analysis shows that joint democracies tend not to resort to the use of force against each other, it is also shown that dyads that do not have territorial claims do not use force against each other. On the whole, the latter accounts for more of the peaceful dyads. Two time periods—the Cold War and Post-Cold War—were examined to identify peaceful dyads, which were defined as dyads that never used militarized force against each other (i.e. were MID-free). It was found that approximately 90% of the peaceful dyads were those that had no previous territorial claims. In contrast it was found that roughly 7%-22% of the peaceful dyads were joint democracies in the two respective periods. This means that the territorial explanation accounts for a large number of the cases while the democratic explanation accounts for under 25%. From this it can be concluded that territory is a more important factor than regime type in predicting peace, although the absence of territorial issues is not seen as a necessary condition of peace.

Additionally, it was found that a possible reason that joint democracies are peaceful is they rarely contend over territorial issues. In the Cold War 88% of the joint democracies do not have territorial claims against each other and in the Post-Cold War period 84% do not have territorial claims against each other. An examination of non-joint democracies that have no MIDs also revealed a similar pattern suggesting that regime type is not as important as territory or issue type in determining peaceful relations. While there are still a variety of tests and empirical probes that can be done, the research here provides evidence that peaceful dyads that are free from the use of militarized force are those that do not have territorial issues and that this characteristic is more prevalent than both sides being democratic in the population of peaceful dyads. These results are very similar to the findings on the absence of war where it was found that the joint democracies that never have wars rarely have territorial MIDs (Vasquez 2014). Further testing will see if these results will be sustained with other data and time periods, but for the

time being the territorial peace has been given credence.

Acknowledgement

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Appendix

Table A1. Dyads That Remain Jointly Democratic Their Entire Existence 1816-2001

Country Code A	Country Name A	Country Code B	Country Name B
2	United States	20	Canada
2	United States	666	Israel
52	Trinidad and Tobago	101	Venezula
200	United Kingdom	666	Israel
325	Italy	349	Slovenia
565	Namibia	571	Botswana
740	Japan	910	Papua New Guinea
750	India	910	Papua New Guinea
N=8			

Table A2. Dyads That Remain Jointly Democratic from 1816 to 1945

Country Code A	Country Name A	Country Code B	Country Name B
2	United States	20	Canada
N=1			

Table A3. Dyads That Remain Jointly Democratic from 1946 to 1989

Country Code A	Country Name A	Country Code B	Country Name B
2	United States	20	Canada
2	United States	200	United Kingdom
2	United States	225	Switzerland
2	United States	305	Austria
2	United States	380	Sweden
2	United States	666	Israel
2	United States	740	Japan
20	Canada	375	Finland
20	Canada	740	Japan
52	Trinidad and Tobago	101	Venezula
94	Costa Rica	740	Japan
200	United Kingdom	210	Netherlands
200	United Kingdom	225	Switzerland
200	United Kingdom	305	Austria
200	United Kingdom	375	Finland
200	United Kingdom	380	Sweden

200	United Kingdom	385	Norway
200	United Kingdom	390	Denmark
200	United Kingdom	666	Israel
200	United Kingdom	740	Japan
210	Netherlands	211	Belgium
210	Netherlands	740	Japan
305	Austria	325	Italy
385	Norway	390	Denmark
385	Norway	900	Australia
740	Japan	900	Australia
740	Japan	910	Papua New Guinea
740	Japan	920	New Zealand
750	India	910	Papua New Guinea
910	Papua New Guinea	940	Solomon Islands

Table A4. Dyads That Remain Jointly Democratic from 1990 to 2001

Country Code A	Country Name A	Country Code B	Country Name B
2	United States	20	Canada
2	United States	91	Honduras
2	United States	92	El Salvador
2	United States	93	Nicaragua
2	United States	95	Panama
2	United States	100	Columbia
2	United States	101	Venezuela
2	United States	130	Ecuador
2	United States	140	Brazil
2	United States	155	Chile
2	United States	200	United Kingdom
2	United States	220	France
2	United States	225	Switzerland
2	United States	230	Spain
2	United States	255	Germany
2	United States	305	Austria
2	United States	310	Hungary
2	United States	315	Czechoslovakia
2	United States	325	Italy
2	United States	350	Greece
2	United States	355	Cyprus
2	United States	380	Sweden
2	United States	640	Turkey
2	United States	666	Israel
2	United States	740	Japan

20	Canada	92	El Salvador
20	Canada	220	France
20	Canada	230	Spain
20	Canada	255	Germany
20	Canada	310	Hungary
20	Canada	325	Italy
20	Canada	355	Cyprus
20	Canada	375	Finland
20	Canada	740	Japan
52	Trinidad and Tobago	101	Venezuela
91	Honduras	92	El Salvador
91	Honduras	93	Nicaragua
91	Honduras	200	United Kingdom
91	Honduras	255	Germany
91	Honduras	325	Italy
91	Honduras	740	Japan
92	El Salvador	93	Nicaragua
92	El Salvador	255	Germany
92	El Salvador	325	Italy
92	El Salvador	740	Japan
93	Nicaragua	94	Costa Rica
93	Nicaragua	100	Columbia
93	Nicaragua	255	Germany
93	Nicaragua	325	Italy
93	Nicaragua	355	Cyprus
93	Nicaragua	740	Japan
94	Costa Rica	95	Panama
94	Costa Rica	255	Germany
94	Costa Rica	325	Italy
94	Costa Rica	740	Japan
95	Panama	255	Germany
95	Panama	325	Italy
95	Panama	740	Japan
100	Columbia	101	Venezuela
100	Columbia	130	Ecuador
100	Columbia	140	Brazil
100	Columbia	155	Chile
100	Columbia	200	United Kingdom
100	Columbia	220	France
100	Columbia	255	Germany
100	Columbia	325	Italy
101	Venezuela	155	Chile
101	Venezuela	200	United Kingdom
101	Venezuela	210	Netherlands

101	Venezuela	220	France
101	Venezuela	255	Germany
101	Venezuela	325	Italy
101	Venezuela	740	Japan
140	Brazil	145	Bolivia
140	Brazil	160	Argentina
140	Brazil	200	United Kingdom
140	Brazil	220	France
140	Brazil	255	Germany
140	Brazil	325	Italy
140	Brazil	740	Japan
145	Bolivia	155	Chile
145	Bolivia	160	Argentina
145	Bolivia	255	France
145	Bolivia	325	Italy
145	Bolivia	740	Japan
155	Chile	160	Argentina
155	Chile	200	United Kingdom
155	Chile	220	France
155	Chile	255	Germany
155	Chile	325	Italy
155	Chile	740	Japan
160	Argentina	165	Uruguay
160	Argentina	200	United Kingdom
160	Argentina	220	France
160	Argentina	255	Germany
160	Argentina	740	Japan
165	Uruguay	200	United Kingdom
165	Uruguay	255	Germany
200	United Kingdom	210	Netherlands
200	United Kingdom	220	France
200	United Kingdom	225	Switzerland
200	United Kingdom	230	Spain
200	United Kingdom	235	Portugal
200	United Kingdom	255	Germany
200	United Kingdom	305	Austria
200	United Kingdom	310	Hungary
200	United Kingdom	315	Czechoslovakia
200	United Kingdom	325	Italy
200	United Kingdom	350	Greece
200	United Kingdom	355	Cyprus
200	United Kingdom	368	Lithuania
200	United Kingdom	375	Finland
200	United Kingdom	380	Sweden

200	United Kingdom	385	Norway
200	United Kingdom	390	Denmark
200	United Kingdom	640	Turkey
200	United Kingdom	666	Israel
200	United Kingdom	740	Japan
210	Netherlands	211	Belgium
210	Netherlands	220	France
210	Netherlands	255	Germany
210	Netherlands	740	Japan
211	Belgium	255	Germany
220	France	230	Spain
220	France	235	Portugal
220	France	255	Germany
220	France	310	Hungary
220	France	315	Czechoslovakia
220	France	325	Italy
220	France	350	Greece
220	France	355	Cyprus
220	France	368	Lithuania
220	France	380	Sweden
220	France	640	Turkey
220	France	740	Japan
220	France	900	Australia
220	France	920	New Zealand
225	Switzerland	255	Germany
230	Spain	235	Portugal
230	Spain	255	Germany
230	Spain	325	Italy
235	Portugal	255	Germany
255	Germany	305	Austria
255	Germany	310	Hungary
255	Germany	315	Czechoslovakia
255	Germany	325	Italy
255	Germany	350	Greece
255	Germany	355	Cyprus
255	Germany	366	Estonia
255	Germany	367	Latvia
255	Germany	368	Lithuania
255	Germany	375	Finland
255	Germany	380	Sweden
255	Germany	385	Norway
255	Germany	390	Denmark

255	Germany	640	Turkey
255	Germany	740	Japan
255	Germany	900	Australia
255	Germany	920	New Zealand
260	German Federal Rep	315	Czechoslovakia
290	Poland	366	Estonia
290	Poland	367	Latvia
290	Poland	368	Lithuania
305	Austria	310	Hungary
305	Austria	315	Czechoslovakia
305	Austria	325	Italy
310	Hungary	315	Czechoslovakia
310	Hungary	325	Italy
325	Italy	349	Slovenia
325	Italy	350	Greece
325	Italy	355	Cyprus
325	Italy	368	Lithuania
325	Italy	380	Sweden
325	Italy	390	Denmark
325	Italy	640	Turkey
325	Italy	900	Australia
325	Italy	920	New Zealand
350	Greece	355	Cyprus
350	Greece	640	Turkey
352	Cyprus	640	Turkey
352	Cyprus	666	Israel
355	Bulgaria	640	Turkey
385	Norway	390	Denmark
565	Namibia	571	Botswana
732	South Korea	740	Japan
740	Japan	840	Philippines
740	Japan	900	Australia
740	Japan	910	Papua New Guinea
740	Japan	920	New Zealand
750	India	910	Papua New Guinea

N = 225