

Surveying Indians' Foreign Policy Orientations in Territorial Disputes

Author(s): Sarah Fisher and Florian Justwan

Source: *The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 1
(WINTER/SPRING 2020), pp. 5-29

Published by: McFarland & Company

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26912760>

REFERENCES

Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:

https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26912760?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents

You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



McFarland & Company is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies*

JSTOR

Surveying Indians' Foreign Policy Orientations in Territorial Disputes: A Case Study

Sarah Fisher and Florian Justwan

Structured Abstract

Article Type: Research Paper

Purpose: This project tested whether two foreign policy orientations, militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism, influence public opinion toward the Sino-Indian dispute over Arunachal Pradesh.

*Design, Methodology, Approach—*This article presents results from an original face-to-face survey (N = 1,048) in which Indian respondents were asked a series of questions about a territorial dispute.

Findings: Our findings suggest that (1) foreign policy orientations are somewhat generalizable to an Indian context and (2) these orientations impact individuals' support for compromise in border disputes.

*Practical Implications—*This article presents the results of an original face-to-face survey in India with useful findings for both policymakers and academics. Foreign policy attitudes regarding border disputes are a critical issue since uncompromising individuals have the potential to motivate governments to pursue hardline policies.

*Originality, Value—*While international relations theory often claims generalizability, few studies have focused on mass foreign policy orientations outside of Western Europe and North America. Moreover, the conflict management literature

Fisher: Emory & Henry College, Department of Politics, Law, and International Relations, 330A McGlothlin-Street Hall, P.O. Box 947, Emory, Virginia, 24327; Phone: +1 276-944-6956; Fax: 276-944-6695; email: sfisher@ehc.edu

Justwan: University of Idaho, Department of Politics and Philosophy, 875 Perimeter Drive, MS 3165, Moscow, Idaho 83844-3165, Phone: +1 208-885-4156, email: fjustwan@uidaho.edu



Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies / Volume 7, Number 1 / Winter/Spring 2020 / pp. 5–29 /
ISSN 2288-6834 (Print) / © 2020 Yonsei University

Surveying Indians' Foreign Policy Orientations in Territorial Disputes

5

has only recently begun examining individual level determinants of attitudes toward territorial disputes. This article tests theoretical assumptions about attitudes toward border disputes at the individual level of analysis and in a non-Western context.

Keywords: foreign policy orientations, India,
original survey, territorial disputes

I. Introduction

This article presents results from a face-to-face survey (n=1,048¹) in which Indian respondents were asked a series of questions about a territorial dispute. The goal for this project was to test whether foreign policy orientations, militant internationalism (MI) and cooperative internationalism (CI), influence individuals' opinions toward the Sino-Indian dispute over Arunachal Pradesh. There are many factors that influence attitudes toward territorial conflict, and this article examines whether foreign policy orientations influence attitudes toward compromise in territorial disputes. At their core, foreign policy orientations capture how individuals view the primacy of the use of force and the likelihood of cooperation in world affairs. Building on previous work on foreign policy orientations,² this paper argues that an individual's general foreign policy orientation impacts specific policy preferences in territorial disputes. The authors find those ranking high on militant internationalism are more likely to support hardline policies and disapprove of compromise solutions. By contrast, Indian citizens with a general penchant for cooperation were more likely to support peaceful conflict management proposals in the case of Arunachal Pradesh.

This project combines previous work on foreign policy orientations, based almost exclusively in the U.S. and Western Europe, and research on policy preferences about territorial disputes. International relations scholars have shown that ordinary citizens have a coherent belief structure that impacts their opinions on foreign policy issues. In particular, previous research has identified militant internationalism, cooperative internationalism, and isolationism as three foreign policy orientations that influence policy preferences with regard to specific issues.³

Despite theoretical and conceptual advances, researchers still do not know if and how these basic orientations influence public opinion with regard to territorial disputes. This is a shortcoming for two important reasons. *First*, the field still knows little about the general factors that shape individual level policy preferences in border disputes. Conflict management has only recently begun to study the determinants of public opinion in this issue area.⁴ *Second*, while international relations theory often pays lip service to generalizability, very few studies focus on mass foreign policy orientations outside of Western Europe and North America.⁵ This study is one of the first attempts to test theories about foreign policy orientations in an Indian context.

This article contributes to the field in several ways. First, results suggest that militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism impact attitudes toward

specific policies regarding border disputes. Thus, in order to fully understand conflict management and territorial disputes, one must consider the individual level of analysis. Second, it suggests that these underlying foreign policy orientations can be applied beyond the Western context, and India is a particularly valuable case when examining issues related to conflict management.

II. Territorial Disputes and Foreign Policy Orientations

As leaders in a democracy, foreign policy executives must be conscious of public opinion when creating foreign policy.⁶ Various factors influence the settlement of territorial disputes, and previous scholars have found that public opinion is a crucially important determinant for the likelihood of settlement.⁷ Most existing studies that focus on societal attitudes in this issue area examine how country- or dispute-level variables such as regime type or issue salience influence aggregate public opinion. For example, conflicts over homeland territories have been found to create relatively hawkish foreign policy preferences.⁸ While these studies are valuable, they obscure differences within countries. To date, very few studies examine the individual-level determinants of public opinion about territorial disputes. Tanaka⁹ shows that Japanese respondents who live closer to a territorial dispute are more likely to favor concessions than those who live far away from the disputed territory. This finding suggests that citizen-attitudes toward conflict management can be predicted with basic individual-level attributes. Nevertheless, beyond Tanaka's work, the field knows very little about other causes of mass opinions in this realm. This article works to fill that gap by (1) examining intrastate variation and (2) examining how an individual's general outlook on foreign policy influences preferences toward conflict management policies.

One way of studying mass foreign policy attitudes is through examining foreign policy orientations. There is a rich literature on the precise character, number, and labeling of these foreign policy orientations. Detailed discussions of the debates within this subfield are beyond the scope of this paper,¹⁰ but foreign policy orientations lend themselves to the study of territorial disputes. In a similar way as liberals or conservatives in the United States might view domestic policy proposals through an ideological lens, foreign policy orientations provide citizens with "ontological assumptions"¹¹ about a state's role in the world, the primacy of the use of force, or the level of threat in the international environment. Simply put, a citizen's general foreign policy postures will inform her attitudes toward specific issue areas.¹² These orientations, then, should impact an individual's attitudes toward conflict management proposals in territorial disputes.

There are at least three dimensions through which citizens view foreign policy: militant internationalism (MI), cooperative internationalism (CI), and isolationism.¹³ The MI, CI, and isolationist framework highlights several sets of values: internationalism/isolationism and militant/cooperative. Those scoring high on the internation-

alist orientation see international issues, as opposed to domestic issues, as a primary concern for the state. On the other hand, isolationists think the state should primarily look inward; states should be concerned with what happens within their borders rather than actively seeking out conflict or cooperation with neighbors.

In conjunction with the internationalist/isolationist axis, research suggests that internationalists need to be further divided along militant and cooperative lines. Citizens who score high on MI see security and strength as primary drivers for foreign policy. Militant internationalists view hard power as the primary and the most effective tool in international politics. By contrast, CI correlates with a willingness to strengthen ties with a former enemy or support working with an international organization.¹⁴ Rather than thinking primarily as a citizen of a country for whom traditional national security concerns are paramount, those with CI values identify with and have “concern for all human beings.”¹⁵ Likewise, individuals who support a multilateral or cooperative approach are more likely to show concern for the “wider community” in survey questions regarding foreign aid or the global environment.¹⁶

Studies in the U.S. and elsewhere suggest that these general orientations impact how individuals interpret specific foreign policy issues.¹⁷ For example, these orientations have been applied to examining cooperation in the European Union. Studying German Members of Parliament (MP), Bayram found that cooperative internationalism (what she also calls “multilateralism”) correlates with positive attitudes toward European integration whereas militant internationalists and isolationists are more hostile to European integration. The general foreign policy orientations acted as heuristics, allowing MPs to wade through complex issues surrounding cooperation on the continent.¹⁸

Though these approaches were originally developed in a U.S. Cold War context, studies in Sweden,¹⁹ the United Kingdom, France, and Germany²⁰ suggest that these viewpoints have some applicability to citizenries outside of the United States. However, with few notable exceptions²¹ and one study of Indian elites,²² these studies are still limited to the U.S. and Western Europe. Applying foreign policy orientations cross-nationally is challenging. For instance, Ganguly et al.’s²³ study applies MI and CI to Indian foreign policy elites with some caveats. For example, Ganguly et al. note that labeling someone “militant,” as in militant internationalist, has negative and unintended connotations (“Militant” is exchangeable with “Jihadi”). Even so, their work shows that “attitudes of survey respondents on specific issues are not random but are organized according to more general belief systems.”²⁴ Yet, the field has not yet fully explored foreign policy orientations beyond policymaking elite or in a non-Western context.

Using the most established framework for studying foreign policy orientations, this study argues that foreign policy orientations affect how members of the general public view a border dispute. These broad orientations, MI and CI, serve as a heuristic for individuals weighing the pros and cons for particular policy choices.²⁵ In particular, MI and CI foreign policy orientations²⁶ can and should be applied to the study of public opinion in border disputes. We apply this framework to Indian atti-

tudes toward the border dispute between China and India over Arunachal Pradesh, a territory in Northeast India.

At their core, MI and CI reveal preferences toward the use of force and the likelihood of cooperation, respectively. Border disputes present states with a menu of foreign policy options, such as the application of military force or the granting of territorial concessions. States may choose policies that emphasize compromise, or they can pursue hardline policies toward their international rivals. When confronted with such policy choices, an individual's general foreign policy attitude will influence their degree of support for certain policies. The authors have differing expectations for cooperative internationalist and militant internationalist foreign policy frames.

As noted, cooperative internationalism reflects values of "self-sacrifice and service to others."²⁷ This framework values solidarity in global affairs, adhering to a logic that through cooperation states can achieve more than through defection. Given these underpinnings, cooperative internationalist values should be particularly important in border disputes. Rather than seeing the world as zero-sum game, cooperative internationalist believe that "cooperation leads to mutual gains."²⁸ Cooperation in international relations often requires compromise with other states. In border disputes, refusal to entertain proposals that give up any ground (literally and figuratively) stops negotiations before they begin. Willingness to give up a territorial claim in exchange for a peaceful settlement represents some sort of compromise. Those with cooperative internationalist values should be more supportive of these types of policy proposals, thus leading to Hypothesis 1.

Hypothesis 1: Individuals scoring high on cooperative internationalism will be more likely to support policies that involve compromise in exchange for peaceful settlement than individuals scoring low on cooperative internationalism.

Militant internationalist values, by contrast, should correspond with more hawkish, assertive, hardline foreign policy attitudes. People who hold these values believe that "lack of credibility and signs of weakness invite challenges by aggressive foes in a dangerous environment."²⁹ Individuals with MI values think that a state should have a strong military force, robust defensive capabilities, and be ready to deploy those capabilities if needed. Moreover, these military forces are the primary way to achieve goals in the international arena. Those expressing militant internationalist values will be less supportive of policy proposals that involve compromise. Compromising on border disputes is likely seen as a weakness, an invitation to allow others to trespass on a state's territory. Those who score high on militant internationalist views should approve of hardline policies that refuse any compromise solutions.

Hypothesis 2: Individuals scoring high on militant internationalism will be more likely to support uncompromising policies than respondents who score low on militant internationalism.

In sum, this article expects that MI and CI will predict individual level attitudes about territorial disputes. This leaves the third frame, isolationism. Unlike some

foreign policy dilemmas, such as a country's stance on free trade or climate change, border disputes in which one's state is a defender forces an isolationist to engage. Thus, the authors have no strong theoretical expectations for isolationism. Measurement of isolationism is discussed in the control section.

III. Case Selection

We chose to focus on the border dispute between India and China over Arunachal Pradesh for three reasons. First, the clearly bilateral nature of the dispute makes it a good candidate to test theories about foreign policy orientations and territorial disputes. Historically, Arunachal Pradesh has been a place of contention between India and China since even before Indian independence or the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Currently, China challenges Indian control over about 32,000 square miles in what is now Northeast India.³⁰ China continues to regard the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh as its own territory and claims it as "South Tibet."³¹ Not all of India's territorial disputes are as clear cut. For instance, the India-Pakistan-Kashmir dispute involves at least three relatively powerful actors, that of the central government in India, the central government in Pakistan, and the state government of Jammu and Kashmir. Our goal for this project was to explore public opinion about interstate territorial disputes, not to apply foreign policy orientations to what might be viewed as a domestic issue between India and Kashmir. The Arunachal Pradesh dispute presents a cleaner research design to test theories about foreign policy orientations.

Second, for both politicians and ordinary citizens, the dispute over Arunachal Pradesh has become more contentious in recent years.³² China has recently begun issuing "stapled visas" to residents of Arunachal Pradesh wishing to travel to China. These documents have no legal standing from the Indian government's perspective, but the Chinese government claims that residents of Arunachal Pradesh have no need for a regular, "stamped" Chinese visas. From China's perspective, citizens in Arunachal Pradesh are already living in Chinese territory, thus a visa is redundant.³³ Moreover, in June 2016, reports surfaced that the Peoples Liberation Army went beyond the Line of Actual Control (the de facto border between both countries) in Arunachal Pradesh. China denied these allegations; a Chinese spokesperson said that the "China and India border has not yet been demarcated."³⁴ China's actions have sparked various protests. In addition to one Indian Member of Parliament saying he would "prefer to take a bullet on the chest"³⁵ than file for a stapled visa, China's actions have sparked public protests. During one protest in Delhi, university students and other demonstrators from the Arunachal Civil Society group held signs with "Stop Chinese Movement in Arunachal Pradesh" and "Who am I, Indian or Chinese?"³⁶ These, along with even more recent incursions, suggest that this dispute is salient among the Indian population.

Third, Arunachal Pradesh is linked to other border conflicts between India and China—such as Aksai Chin. The latter is a relatively small piece of territory in the

Himalayas, held by China but claimed by India. China controls about 17,000 square miles of land in Aksai Chin.³⁷ Over the years, some creative proposals have been made to solve this dispute. In one proposal from 1960, the Chinese Premier proposed a trade. India would give up claims to Aksai Chin, and China would give up claims to Arunachal Pradesh.³⁸ Reports surfaced again in 2013 that the Indian government was “willing to give up its claims to Aksai Chin if China does the same for Arunachal [Pradesh].”³⁹ Despite attempts to solve these disputes, the territories remain contentious.

IV. Survey Design and Methodology

To test theoretical expectations, the researchers rely on original survey data. To conduct this survey, the authors contracted with a survey research firm in India. The firm, Market-Xcel, conducted a face-to-face survey of 1,048 individuals in the National Capital Territory of Delhi.⁴⁰ The survey was administered in both English and Hindi and included questions about foreign policy attitudes and standard demographic questions.⁴¹ Given that geographic location likely has a strong impact on attitudes toward territorial disputes, this research design holds respondents’ geographic location constant. The primary purpose for this survey was to test whether and how MI and CI influence attitudes toward policy proposals, not whether proximity to a border claim influences one’s attitude toward territorial disputes.⁴² Thus, the survey provides a representative sample of one of India’s 36 subnational regions (India has 29 states and 7 union territories), the National Capital Territory of Delhi (NCT). Within this area, the survey was aimed at the broadest cross section possible; the sampling firm ensured that gender, age, education, and religion were roughly representative of the selected region.⁴³

After providing their consent to the terms of the survey and answering standard demographic questions, respondents were asked to turn their attention to the territorial dispute over Arunachal Pradesh. Respondents were read the statement, “As you may know, China has long claimed a large part of Arunachal Pradesh. China wants to incorporate this region into its own territory. Over the past few decades, leaders from both countries have unsuccessfully tried to resolve this disagreement [...]” Respondents were then asked how much they would support/oppose policies if they were pursued by the Indian government.

V. Variable Measurement

Dependent Variables: Policy Proposals for Arunachal Pradesh

Hypotheses were tested using three dependent variables. Each variable corresponds with a different policy option (summarized in Table 1). For each policy, respondents used a scale from 1 to 5 with 1 being “Strongly Oppose” and 5 being “Strongly Support.” Since the authors are mostly interested in preferences toward a

particular policy, it was recoded from a five-point scale into a binary indicator that takes on a value of “1” if a respondent supported or strongly supported a given policy and “0” otherwise.

Option 1 is a hardline proposal to “refuse any compromise solution and retain firm control over the entirety of Arunachal Pradesh.” Authors expect that individuals with more militant internationalist values will approve of this option whereas people with higher levels of cooperative internationalist values will disapprove. Furthermore, two solutions were included that might resolve the conflict through some form of concessions. Option 2 suggested a compromise. India would “give up parts of Arunachal Pradesh to China in exchange for a guarantee that the dispute is resolved.” Finally, Option 3 asked respondents to consider “giv[ing] up the claim to Aksai Chin in return for China dropping its claim to Arunachal Pradesh.” Individuals that scored high on cooperative internationalist values were expected to approve of these options and those who scored high on militant internationalism to be less supportive of these policies.

Table 1: Dependent Variables—Policy Proposals

I have a list of some potential policies regarding the dispute over Arunachal Pradesh. If these policies were pursued by the Indian government, how much would you support these on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 means “Strongly Oppose” and 5 means “Strongly Support”? (N = 1,048; options were randomized)

1. Refuse any compromise solution and retain firm control over the entirety of Arunachal Pradesh.
2. Compromise with China: give up parts of Arunachal Pradesh to China in exchange for a guarantee that the dispute is resolved.
3. Compromise with China: give up the claim to Aksai Chin in return for China dropping its claim to Arunachal Pradesh.

Independent Variables: Militant Internationalism and Cooperative Internationalism

To create the primary independent variables, two additive scales were created. Both scales consist of five survey items. The reliability coefficient (alpha) is 0.75 for both scales.

There are a variety of survey items that have been used to identify militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism. However, some of the existing measures for these concepts are problematic for present purposes. Since most studies on foreign policy orientations have been conducted in the United States or Western Europe, many existing survey items are too country-specific or only applicable to a particular historical context (such as the Cold War). For example, authors did not include the question “There is considerable validity in the domino theory that when one nation falls to communism, others nearby will soon follow a similar path.”⁴⁴ This question is reasonable in the U.S. during the Cold War, but not in 21st-century India.

Authors surveyed the literature for generalizable questions to construct measures for two primary independent variables of interest.

**Table 2: Survey Items Used to Create
“Militant Internationalism”**

1. India should spend more money on its armed forces even if it means spending less in other areas.¹ N = 1,026
2. India needs to be able to project military force into the Gulf.¹ N = 1,016
3. India needs to adopt more tough-minded measures to limit illegal immigration.² N = 1,028
4. India should retaliate against foreign powers supporting terrorists.² N = 1,020
5. India should use force to attain its foreign policy goals.² N = 1,007

1. From Ganguly et al. (2016, p. 425). Used to measure attitudes toward military capabilities.

2. From Ganguly et al. (2016, p. 425). Used to measure attitudes toward forcefulness.

Militant internationalism was created using five survey items. These items have all been previously used to measure attitudes toward military capabilities and forcefulness,⁴⁵ and they tap into individuals' attitudes toward the importance of national defense and the validity of the use of force in international affairs. As such, these statements capture a respondent's "willingness to meet the world with a clenched fist."⁴⁶ For instance, the first two items ("India should spend more money on its armed forces even if it means spending less in other areas" and "India needs to be able to project military force into the Gulf") are intended to tap into a respondent's general attitudes toward traditionally defined "hard power." While cooperative internationalism does not exclude the possibility of military force, MI places more value in hard power than soft power. Each survey item was measured with a five-point scale in which higher values correspond with higher levels of MI. Respondents were asked how much they agreed/disagreed with statements such as "India should use force to attain its foreign policy goals" and "India should retaliate against foreign powers supporting terrorists." Response categories for all survey items were: strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat agree, and strongly agree. An additive index was created based on the five survey questions displayed in Table 2, and then the measure was re-scaled to make the scores bounded between 0 and 1.

Like militant internationalism, the cooperative internationalism measure was created using five survey items. These survey questions have been previously employed to measure CI values⁴⁷ or components of CI, such as cooperation and multilateralism.⁴⁸ Survey items 1 and 4 are adapted from Kertzer⁴⁹ who used these items to measure cooperative internationalist values in the United States. In addition, three items included from Ganguly et al.⁵⁰ were designed to measure attitudes toward international cooperation and multilateralism. These items are straightforward. For example, the survey question, "India needs to cooperate more with the United Nations" gets at whether a respondent is willing to work with an international organization

on global issues. A willingness to work with other countries fits neatly into the standard formulation of CI. In a similar question, respondents evaluated the statement, “It is essential for India to work with other nations to solve problems such as over-population.” Similarly, this question gauges respondents’ willingness to work with other countries and their interest in dealing with non-security related issues such as population. Agreement with these survey questions indicates positive attitudes toward “multilateral behavior aimed at collective welfare issues at the international level.”⁵¹ Individuals responded to each statement using the same five-point scale. Similar to the MI scale, authors created an additive measure (re-scaled to make it bounded between 0 and 1). The scale reliability coefficient for this item is 0.75. A complete list of survey items used to capture cooperative internationalism is included in Table 3.

Table 3: Survey Items Used to Create “Cooperative Internationalism”

1. It is essential for India to work with other nations to solve problems such as over-population.¹ N = 1,021
2. India’s foreign policy goals can be attained more effectively by pursuing collective global welfare.² N = 989
3. India should continue to espouse the cause of nuclear disarmament.³ N = 984
4. India needs to cooperate more with the United Nations.¹ N = 1,017
5. It is in India’s interest to support the emergent global norm of “responsibility to protect.”³ N = 1,004

-
1. From Kertzer et al. (2014, Supplemental materials, p. 3). Used to measure cooperative internationalism.
 2. From Ganguly et al. (2016, p. 425). Used to measure attitudes toward multilateralism.
 3. From Ganguly et al. (2016, p. 425). Used to measure attitudes toward cooperation.

Other Independent Variables

For control purposes, the authors also included a measure of isolationism. Wittkopf focuses primarily on the cooperative internationalist and militant internationalist dichotomy, but others have added a third dimension, isolationism.⁵² Individuals who hold isolationist views are likely to focus on domestic goals rather than internationalist goals. For instance, individuals who think that protecting American jobs is a top policy priority are more likely to harbor isolationist views. Isolationist views are distinct from cooperative internationalism and militant internationalism because they stem from the notion that one’s country “should avoid political entanglements with other countries.”⁵³ While isolationism may be a crucial element if a country is debating a foreign aid budget or the merits of a far-flung military intervention, we argue that border disputes force an isolationist to engage. When faced with a border dispute, strong isolationist preferences offer little in the way of policy preferences. Isolationist values might suggest ignoring the dispute; for low salience territorial disputes, this might be an option. However, given the prominence of territorial dis-

putes in the Indian public, isolationism was not expected to be the most important predictor of policy approval/disapproval. On the other hand, the dispute over Arunachal Pradesh is not open conflict, so it is possible that some respondents might fall back on isolationist tendencies. Moreover, India has a long history of non-alignment, so it is possible that respondents might simply want to avoid conflict. Thus, isolationism is an important control variable. Isolationism was measured on a five-point scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). Individuals who strongly agreed with “This country would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world” are more isolationist than those who disagreed.⁵⁴

Authors included a range of other standard control variables from the public opinion literature. Gender is coded as 0/1 with zero being female and one being male. Education was measured with an ordinal scale ranging from “illiterate” to “graduate degree.” Income is operationalized on an ordered five-point scale in which higher values indicate lower levels of income. Furthermore, authors included a dummy variable for whether an individual self-identifies as Hindu.

For attitudes toward politics, authors included measures of ideology, general threat perception, and whether a given respondent is a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) supporter. Authors were particularly interested in whether being a BJP supporter influenced respondents’ opinions toward policy choices. Prime Minister Modi is a member of the BJP, a party generally considered to be a right-wing Hindu nationalist party.⁵⁵ Although much of Modi’s foreign policy stance focuses on attracting foreign direct investment, Modi has rejected proposals to compromise over the costal border between the northwest state of Gujarat and Pakistan. He has also criticized the previous government’s position on China as “naiveté.”⁵⁶ Authors expect BJP supporters to be in line with more hardline stances with regard to border disputes. In this dataset, BJP supporters are coded as “1” and non-BJP supporters are coded as “0.” In addition, respondents were asked to consider how threatened they think India is by other countries. This variable is coded on a scale from 1 to 4 where smaller values correspond to lower levels of perceived threat. Individuals who feel India is very threatened will be more drawn to hardline policies. Finally, the study included a control variable for what role the government should play in the economy as way of approximating political ideology. Higher values on this variable indicate that a respondent thinks that the government should not play a major role in the economy. Descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in Appendix A. All survey questions used to generate the relevant variables are listed in Appendix D.

VI. Results

Three logistic regressions were estimated to test the hypotheses. Overall, this article found strong support for militant internationalist values corresponding with support for hardline policies (Hypothesis 2). Militant internationalism behaves as expected in all three of the models. The variable has a statistically significant and

positive effect on support for a policy to refuse any compromise over Arunachal Pradesh (Model 1), and negative effects on the two compromise proposals (Model 2 and Model 3). The authors also found some support for cooperative internationalism corresponding with policies that emphasize compromise (Hypothesis 1). Increased cooperative internationalism corresponded with stronger approval for the “exchange” option, in which respondents considered giving up India’s claim over Aksai Chin in exchange for China dropping its claim to Arunachal Pradesh. The full results can be found in Table 4, and a more detailed discussion of results follows.


Model 1’s policy proposal was uncompromising. Respondents were asked to consider the policy to “refuse any compromise solution and retain firm control over the entirety of Arunachal Pradesh.” In Model 1, militant internationalists were expected to approve of this proposal and cooperative internationalists disapprove of this proposal. Militant internationalism behaved as expected ($p \leq 0.01$). Respondents who scored high on this variable were more likely to support this hardline

Table 4: Support for Policy Proposals

RESULTS FROM LOGIT MODELS WITH COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS (IN PARENTHESES)			
	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3
<i>INDEPENDENT VARIABLES</i>	DV: REFUSE COMPROMISE	DV: GIVE UP PART OF CLAIM	DV: GIVE UP AC IN EXCHANGE FOR AP
Militant Internationalism	3.759** (0.842)	-4.884** (1.433)	-4.779** (0.997)
Cooperative Internationalism	0.272 (0.828)	1.765 (1.451)	4.454** (0.932)
Isolationism	-0.178* (0.086)	0.514** (0.127)	-0.116 (0.064)
Age	0.008 (0.009)	-0.019 (0.013)	0.004 (0.007)
Gender	-0.173 (0.229)	-0.141 (0.325)	-0.171 (0.196)
Education	0.228** (0.049)	-0.017 (0.080)	0.167** (0.049)
Overall Level of Threat	-0.064 (0.081)	-0.535** (0.158)	0.261* (0.104)
Income	-0.244* (0.124)	0.137 (0.183)	0.049 (0.100)
BJP Supporter	0.055 (0.231)	0.669* (0.322)	0.288 (0.192)
Hindu	-0.373 (0.323)	0.177 (0.477)	0.478 (0.273)
Ideology	0.035 (0.166)	-0.575 (0.270)	-0.881** (0.154)
Constant	-3.291 (0.911)	4.074 (1.168)	-2.032 (0.758)
N	936	936	936
Pseudo R²	0.115	0.190	0.174
Log likelihood	-330.016	-180.184	-403.045

* = $p \leq 0.05$, ** = $p \leq 0.01$


policy with regard to Arunachal Pradesh. In Figure 1, those with more militant internationalist values have a very high probability (92.5 percent) of supporting a no compromise approach to Arunachal Pradesh. At the low end of the militant internationalist spectrum, there is a higher level of uncertainty, but citizens were less likely to approve of a no compromise solution (34.4 percent). This suggests that the underlying foreign policy belief system extends to specific policy areas, such as territorial disputes. Cooperative internationalism, however, is not statistically significant in this model. However, given that China is the clear challenger in this dispute, it is not terribly surprising that even cooperative internationalist values are not enough to lead individuals to disapprove of a hardline policy.



Models 2 and 3 also lend support for the militant internationalism hypothesis. For the dependent variable in Model 2, respondents were asked to consider a compromise with China. The Indian government would give up some part of Arunachal Pradesh in exchange for a guarantee that China would drop the claim to the remaining piece of land. While cooperative internationalism was not statistically significant, higher levels of militant internationalism corresponded with lower levels of support for this policy ($p \leq 0.01$). More specifically, respondents with very high militant internationalist values had a 2.7 percent probability of approving of territorial concessions whereas those with the lowest level of militant internationalist values had a 53.9 percent probability of supporting territorial concessions (see Figure 2).

Model 3, the “exchange” model, produced a similar result for militant internationalism. Higher levels of this variable corresponded with lower levels of support

Figure 2: Predicted Probabilities (Model 2: Give Up Claim)



for the proposal to drop India’s claim over Aksai Chin in exchange for China dropping its claim over Arunachal Pradesh ($p \leq 0.01$). Across the full range of the MI variable, the predicted probability of policy support decreases from 80 percent to 13.4 percent (see Figure 3). This provides further evidence for Hypothesis 2. Interestingly, cooperative internationalism was predictive of positive views toward this policy option ($p \leq 0.01$). For high levels of cooperative internationalism, the probability of supporting the exchange was 37.2 percent. By contrast, at low levels of cooperative internationalism, the predictive margin is only 2.1 percent. This is an especially interesting finding given that there is some evidence that government officials might consider this proposal.⁵⁷

Control variables also presented some notable results. A summary of the results discussed here can be found in Table 5. First, results suggest that isolationism is related to more compromising attitudes in the conflict over Arunachal Pradesh. More specifically, individuals who believe that India would be better off if it “did not concern [itself] with problems in other parts of the world” are more likely to *reject* the uncompromising policy in Model 1 and more likely to *support* territorial concessions in Model 2. Substantively, support for “compromise refusal” decreases by 9.7 percent across the full range of the isolationism variable (from 80.4 percent at low levels of isolationism to 90.1 percent at the maximum of the variable). Similarly, the predicted probability that an individual expresses favorable attitudes about unilateral concessions increases by 15.7 percent (from 2.3 percent to 18.0 percent). These results are consistent with the notion that isolationists would not want to provoke China; rather, those viewing the world through an isolationist lens would rather

Figure 3: Predicted Probabilites (Model 3: Exchange Claims)





Figure 4: Predicted Probabilites (Model 3: Exchange Claims)



compromise with China than risk further hostile engagement. This also suggests that isolationism is an important part of studying foreign policy orientations.

Table 5: Substantive Effect of Control Variables

	MIN	MAX	PR AT MIN	PR AT MAX	CHANGE
<i>Model 1: Refuse Compromise</i>					
Isolationism	1	5	90.1%	80.4%	-9.7%
Income	1	5	92.7%	83.9%	-8.8%
<i>Model 2: Give Up Part of Claim</i>					
Isolationism	1	5	2.3%	18.0%	+15.7%
Overall Level of Threat	1	4	19.6%	3.5%	-16.1%
BJP Supporter	0	1	4.5%	7.9%	+3.4%
<i>Model 3: Exchange Claims</i>					
Overall Level of Threat	1	4	12.2%	25.1%	+12.9%

All other variables were held at their observed values.

Second, as expected, respondents who felt as though India was in a very threatening international environment were less likely to support giving up territory in exchange for a peaceful settlement (predicted probability: 3.5 percent) than individuals who believed that India is generally fairly safe (predicted probability: 19.6 percent). At the same time, perceived external threat leads to more *positive* attitudes toward the claim exchange policy proposal. In particular, people who felt “very threatened” by other countries had a 25.1 percent probability of supporting a claim exchange whereas the corresponding value for individuals who felt “not at all threatened” was 12.2 percent.

While these findings appear to be contradictory at first glance, they are not entirely surprising. In Model 2, individuals respond to a policy proposal in which India makes unilateral territorial concessions. It seems likely that subjects who feel very threatened are skeptical about this policy since it would make India look vulnerable at the world stage and thereby possibly invite further territorial demands. By contrast, if individuals feel relatively safe in India’s international environment, one-sided concessions appear to be less dangerous. For the claim exchange variable analyzed in Model 3, the dynamics are different. Here, threatened individuals should be *more* supportive of the presented policy since the outcome of this deal would eliminate China’s threat to Arunachal Pradesh and therefore improve India’s overall security position.

Third, in Model 1, income has a statistically significant and negative effect on a respondent’s willingness to “refuse compromise” in the dispute over Arunachal Pradesh. More specifically, at the lowest value of this variable, the predicted probability that a respondent expresses favorable attitudes toward an uncompromising strategy toward China is 92.7 percent. By contrast, individuals with high levels of income have a somewhat lower predictive margin (83.9 percent). This suggests that socioeconomic characteristics also influence individual-level attitudes about conflict management proposals.

Finally, the party ID variable did not correspond with expectations. Authors theorized that BJP supporters would be more likely to favor hardline policies on territorial disputes, but the variable was only statistically significant in Model 2. In this model, BJP supporters were more likely to approve of territorial concessions to China. A possible explanation is that Arunachal Pradesh has a history of unrest and cultural difference, and the territory is tucked away in far-flung Northeast India and connected only by the “chicken neck,” a small piece of land connecting Northeast India to Bihar.⁵⁸ Given BJP’s roots in right-wing Hindu nationalism, Arunachal Pradesh, with its high religious diversity, geographic isolation, and cultural difference, might not be seen as a priority for making India a more Hindu state.

VII. Conclusion

Identifying the factors that influence public opinion toward foreign policy issue areas is of crucial importance for both scholars and practitioners. This project is the first step to identify if, how, and when general orientations about foreign policy impact opinions toward specific conflict management policies. The results suggest that general foreign orientations have an impact on individuals’ likelihood to support specific policy proposals. This study found the most support for militant internationalist values corresponding with refusal to compromise. Values of cooperative internationalism are associated with policies that open the door for compromise such as asking China to drop its claim to Arunachal Pradesh in exchange for dropping the dispute over Aksai Chin. In addition to testing a specific issue area, this article applies the established MI/CI framework to a new context, mass attitudes in India. This is one of the first studies of its kind, and we hope that this study encourages other scholars to (1) test supposedly universal theories in a non-Western context and (2) conduct more survey work in India in particular. Given India’s large population, diversity, and global status, this state will only become more important in world affairs. Moreover, India is an underutilized case study for a variety of pressing questions in the field, whether those be questions about border disputes, political tolerance, democracy, or social trust. The authors hope to continue work on public opinion in India; expanding this survey to a population center in South India might be especially interesting given South India’s history and politics. In addition, exploring whether and how these views influence voting preferences would be an excellent avenue for future research.

Appendix

Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics

VARIABLE	MIN	MAX	MEAN	STD. DEV.
<i>Dependent Variables: Policy Proposals</i>				
Refusing any compromises	0	1	0.87	0.33
Give up part of Arunachal Pradesh in exchange for resolution	0	1	0.06	0.23
Give up claim in Aksai Chin in exchange for China giving up claim in Arunachal Pradesh	0	1	0.22	0.41
<i>Independent Variables: Foreign Policy Attitudes</i>				
Militant Internationalism	0.1	1	0.85	0.17
Cooperative Internationalism	0.1	1	0.79	0.18
<i>Control Variables</i>				
Isolationism	1	5	2.89	1.45
Age	18	86	36.72	12.08
Gender	0	1		
Education	1	8	4.98	2.25
Overall Level of Threat	1	4	3.07	1.07
Income	1	5	1.86	1.12
BJP Supporter	0	1		
Hindu	0	1		
Ideology	0	5	1.73	0.88

Appendix B: Sample Representativeness

VARIABLE	POPULATION	SAMPLE
<i>Age</i>		
18–29	36.75%	30%
30–39	24.51%	30%
40–49	17.87%	28%
50–59	10.66%	7%
60 or older	10.21%	4%
<i>Gender</i>		
Male	53.29%	61%
Female	46.71%	39%
<i>Education</i>		
Illiterate	16.09%	19%
Literate	83.91%	81%
<i>Religion</i>		
Hindu	81.68%	78%
Muslim	12.86%	14%
Other	5.46%	8%

The survey was designed to be representative of the population in the NCT region on four major dimensions: age, gender, education, and religion. Furthermore, the survey firm also ensured broad representation of various income groups (although population parameters are not available for this particular variable). Above is a comparison of cell percentages for the sample and the population in the National Capital Territory region (obtained from the 2011 Census).

Appendix C: Sampling Method

Period of Data Collection: January-February 2017.

Sample Provider: Market-Xcel; New Delhi (website: <http://www.market-xcel.com>)

Method of data collection: face-to-face interviews.

Sample Stratification:

- There are 70 “constituencies” in the National Capital Territory. Within each of those constituencies, there are numerous “polling areas.” The latter are administrative regions that determine in which specific buildings residents cast their ballot during regional elections.
- The survey firm randomly selected 3 polling areas per constituency for interviews. Thus, there were 210 “interview zones” (3 polling areas in each of New Delhi’s 70 constituencies).
- Market X-cel had access to the electoral roll in the NCT territory. This allowed the company to randomly select 5 households in each “interview zone.”
- One respondent was interviewed in each randomly selected household.
- The final number of interviews was 1,048 (5 interviews in each of the 210 interview zones).

Appendix D: Survey Questions

Dependent Variables:

Attitudes About Concessions: I have a list of some of the potential policies regarding the dispute over Arunachal Pradesh. If these policies were pursued by the Indian government, how much would you support these on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 means “Strongly oppose” and 5 means “Strongly support”?

	STRONGLY OPPOSE	OPPOSE	NEITHER SUPPORT NOR OPPOSE	SUPPORT	STRONGLY SUPPORT
Refuse any compromise solution and retain firm control over the entirety of Arunachal Pradesh	1	2	3	4	5
Compromise with China: give up parts of Arunachal Pradesh to China in exchange for a guarantee that the dispute is resolved	1	2	3	4	5
<i>Other policy options (not relevant for this project) omitted.</i>	1	2	3	4	5

Attitudes About Claim Exchange (Arunachal Pradesh/Aksai Chin): Aksai Chin is a piece of territory controlled by China and claimed by India as the easternmost part of Jammu & Kashmir. There is no human population there. How much would you support or oppose each of the following policies related to this dispute if they were pursued by the Indian government?

	STRONGLY OPPOSE	OPPOSE	NEITHER SUPPORT NOR OPPOSE	SUPPORT	STRONGLY SUPPORT
Compromise with China: give up the claim to Aksai Chin in return for China dropping its claim to Arunachal Pradesh	1	2	3	4	5
<i>Other policy options (not relevant for this project) omitted.</i>	1	2	3	4	5

Main Independent Variables:

Militant Internationalism: Now I have with me a list of views related to Indian foreign policy. We are interested in knowing your extent of agreement with these. Please rate these on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 means “Strongly Disagree” and 5 means “Strongly Agree.”

	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	NEITHER DISAGREE NOR DISAGREE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
India should spend more money on its armed forces even if it means spending less in other areas.	1	2	3	4	5
India needs to be able to project military force into the Gulf.	1	2	3	4	5
India needs to adopt more tough-minded measures to limit illegal immigration.	1	2	3	4	5
India should retaliate against foreign powers supporting terrorists.	1	2	3	4	5
India should use force to attain its foreign policy goals.	1	2	3	4	5

Cooperative Internationalism: Now I have with me a list of views related to Indian foreign policy. We are interested in knowing your extent of agreement with these. Please rate these on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 means “Strongly Disagree” and 5 means “Strongly Agree.”

	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	NEITHER DISAGREE NOR DISAGREE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
It is essential for India to work with other nations to solve problems such as overpopulation	1	2	3	4	5
India’s foreign policy goals can be attained more effectively by pursuing collective global welfare.	1	2	3	4	5
India should continue to espouse the cause of nuclear disarmament.	1	2	3	4	5
India needs to cooperate more with the United Nations	1	2	3	4	5
It is in India’s interest to support the emergent global norm of “responsibility to protect”	1	2	3	4	5

Control Variables:

Isolationism: This country would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world.

1. Strongly Disagree
2. Disagree
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Agree
5. Strongly Agree

Age: Sir/Madam, can you please tell me your age in completed years?

Gender: Are you male or female?

- Male
- Female

Education: What is the highest level to which you have studied?

- Illiterate.
- Literate but no formal education
- School up to 4 years
- School (between 5 and 9 years).
- School (SSC/HSC)
- Some college but not graduate
- Graduate/Post Graduate (General)
- Graduate/Post Graduate (Professional)

Threat Perception: In general, please let me know how threatened do you think is India by other countries?

1. Not at all threatened
2. Not very threatened
3. Somewhat threatened
4. Very threatened

Income: How would you define your current financial position with respect to your personal income? Which of the following statements comes closest to how you feel?

1. I am living comfortably on my present income.
2. I am coping on my present income.
3. I am finding it difficult on my present income.
4. I cannot survive on my present income.
5. I do not have any source of income.

Partisanship: Of all the political parties listed below, which party if any do you feel closest to?

1. Aam Aadmi Party (AAP)
2. Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
3. Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)

4. Communist Party of India (CPI).
5. Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPIM)
6. Indian National Congress (INC)
7. Nationalist Congress Party (NCP)
8. Other National Party
9. Other (Specify _____)
10. No preference/Do not want to reveal

Religious Background: Please tell me, what is your religion background?

1. Hindu
2. Muslim
3. Christian
4. Sikh
5. Buddhist
6. Other
7. None

Ideology (government role in the economy): On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates a preference for an active government role in the economy and 5 a preference for no government role in the economy at all, where would you place yourself?

1. Government should play a very active role in the economy.
2. Government should play an active role in the economy.
3. Government should play a moderately active role in the economy.
4. Government should play a limited role in the economy.
5. Government should not play any role in the economy.

Notes

1. Models presented in this paper all have over 900 responses. The total number of respondents was 1048, but some cases were dropped due to missing data. The authors obtained IRB approval from their respective institutions. The authors contracted with the survey firm Market Xcel based in Delhi, India. Informed consent was obtained for each respondent. A full discussion of survey methodology is found in research design section.

2. Whether or not ordinary citizens have a coherent belief structure with regard to foreign policy has been debated. For an outline of this debate, see Ole R. Holsti, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus Mershon Series: Research Programs and Debates," *International Studies Quarterly* 36 (4) (1992), pp. 416–22, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2600734>; Brian Rathbun et al., "Taking Foreign Policy Personally: Personal Values and Foreign Policy Attitudes," *International Studies Quarterly* 60 (2016), p. 124, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqv012>; for a study of elite foreign policy attitudes in India, see Sumit Ganguly, Timothy Hellwig, and William R. Thompson, "The Foreign Policy Attitudes of Indian Elites: Variance, Structure, and Common Denominators," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 13(2) (2017), pp. 416–22.

3. Holsti, 1992, pp. 449–50; Brian Rathbun et al., 2016, pp. 125–26; A. Burcu Bayram, "Cues for Integration: Foreign Policy Beliefs and German Parliamentarians' Support for European Integration," *German Politics & Society* 35(1)(2017), pp. 19–21, <https://doi.org/10.3167/gps.2017.350102>.

4. Seiki Tanaka, "The Microfoundations of Territorial Disputes: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Japan," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 33 (5) (2017), pp. 516–17, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894215581330>.

5. For a recent example of applying foreign policy orientations beyond a Western context, see Sumit Ganguly et al., 2017, p. 418.
6. Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42 (3) (1988), p. 430, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027697>.
7. Kyle Beardsley and Nigel Lo, "Third-Party Conflict Management and the Willingness to Make Concessions," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58 (2) (2014), p. 364, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002712467932>.
8. Todd L. Allee and Paul K. Huth, "Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover," *The American Political Science Review* 100, no. 2 (2006): 227, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055406062125>; Paul R. Hensel et al., "Bones of Contention: Comparing Territorial, Maritime, and River Issues," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52 (1) (2008), p. 139, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002707310425>.
9. Tanaka, 2017, pp. 516–18.
10. for an overview, see William O. Chittick, Keith R. Billingsley, and Rick Travis, "A Three-Dimensional Model of American Foreign Policy Beliefs," *International Studies Quarterly* 39 (1995), pp. 323–24. and Ganguly, Hellwig, and Thompson, 2017, pp. 424–5.
11. Ganguly, Hellwig, and Thompson, 2017, p. 419.
12. Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley, "How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical Model," *The American Political Science Review* 81 (4)(1987), pp. 1104–05, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1962580>; Rathbun et al., 2016.
13. Eugene R. Wittkopf, "The Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes: An Alternative View," *Social Science Quarterly* 62 (1)(1981), pp. 288, 314–16; Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis, 1995, pp. 314–16; Eugene R. Wittkopf, "Faces of Internationalism in a Transitional Environment," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38 (3)(1994), p. 376, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002794038003002>.
14. Eugene Wittkopf, *Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy* (Duke University Press, 1990), p. 9. Note that in this book, Wittkopf shows that public opinion on American foreign policy can be divided into four categories: internationalists, isolationists, accommodationalists, and hardliners. While the terminology might be different, these concepts are very close to the MI/CI framework; Wittkopf, 1994, pp. 378–83.
15. Rathbun et al., 2016, p. 125.
16. Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis, 1995, p. 318.
17. In this article, MI and CI are used as independent variables that influence specific attitudes towards policy proposals. There has been some recent work on the underlying values and moral foundations of foreign policy orientations. For more on this, see Rathbun et al., pp. 128–29, and Kertzer, Powers, Rathbun, and Iyer, "Moral Support: How Moral Values Shape Foreign Policy Attitudes," *Journal of Politics* 76, no. 3 (2014): 825, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381614000073>.
18. Bayram, 2017, pp. 21–24.
19. Ulf Bjereld and Ann-Marie Ekengren, "Foreign Policy Dimensions: A Comparison Between the United States and Sweden," *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (1999), p. 503, <https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00132>.
20. Jason Reifler, Thomas J. Scotto, and Harold D. Clarke, "Foreign Policy Beliefs in Contemporary Britain: Structure and Relevance," *International Studies Quarterly* 55 (2011), p. 245, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00643.x>; Timothy B. Gravelle, Jason Reifler, and Thomas J. Scotto, "The Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes in Transatlantic Perspective: Comparing the United States, United Kingdom, France and Germany," *European Journal of Political Research* 56 (2017), p. 757, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12197>.
21. Including Costa Rica Jon Hurwitz, Mark Peffley, and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Foreign Policy Belief Systems in Comparative Perspective: The United States and Costa Rica," *International Studies Quarterly* 37 (3)(1993), <https://doi.org/10.2307/2600808>.
22. Ganguly, Hellwig, and Thompson, 2017.
23. Ganguly et al. (2016, pp. 425–426) show that these two dimensions are applicable to the Indian foreign policy elite. But, they take issue with, among other things, the labeling of MI/CI. For example, they argue that labeling someone "militant," as in *militant* internationalist, has negative and unintended connotations ("Militant" is exchangeable with "Jihadi"). They advocate reconceiving of these terms as assertive/nonassertive policy strategies and liberal/realist policy orientations. These debates are important, but beyond the scope of this paper. The primary purpose

is to test whether these MI/CI foreign policy orientations influence attitudes towards border disputes.

24. Ganguly, Hellwig, and Thompson, 2017, p. 417.
25. Bayram, 2017. Bayram tested whether the MI/CI and isolationist framework influenced German politician's views toward European integration. Bayram draws from work on heuristics in political psychology noting that heuristics are a way to help humans deal with complex situations. These foreign policy belief structures help guide politicians when making decisions regarding specific policy proposals. Our causal mechanism is similar. When faced with a complex situation, such as Arunachal Pradesh, and given varying levels of knowledge about the dispute, we expect respondents to rely on their general worldview to assess policy options.
26. Eugene R. Wittkopf and Michael A. Maggionto, "The Two Faces of Internationalism: Public Attitudes Toward American Foreign Policy in the 1970s—and Beyond?" *Social Science Quarterly* 64 (1983), p. 288.
27. Rathbun et al., 2016, p. 125.
28. *Ibid.*
29. *Ibid.*, p. 126.
30. Sergey Radchenko, "The Rise and Fall of Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai," *Foreign Policy* (2014, September 18), n.p.
31. In northeast India more broadly, conflict over Dolam Plateau, a piece of territory in the Siliguri Corridor (or the "Chicken Neck") connecting the northeast to the rest of India, has led to tensions between Bhutan, India, and China. Steven Lee Meyers, Ellen Barry, and Max Fisher, "How India and China Have Come to the Bring Over a Remote Mountain Pass," *New York Times* 2017, July 26, n.p.
32. The issues discussed here also bring up the difficult subject of Tibet. With the Dalai Lama currently residing in India, troops stationed at the border in recent years, and even controversy over China attempting to block an Indian loan in 2009, these territorial disputes are highly contentious for both India and China. Edward Wong, "China and India Dispute Enclave on Edge of Tibet," *New York Times* 2009, n.p.
33. Nitya Singh, "How to Tame Your Dragon: An Evaluation of India's Foreign Policy Toward China," *India Review* 11 (3)(2012), p. 150, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14736489.2012.705632>.
34. PTI, "China Rejects Allegation of Incursion in Arunachal Says Army Was Conducting 'Normal Patrols,'" *The Indian Express*, 2016, June 15.
35. Press Trust of India, "Arunachal Mp Wants to Visit China but Not on Stapled Visa," *Business Standard*, 2016.
36. PTI, "Arunachal Pradesh Activists Protest Stapled Visa Issue," *The Economic Times*, 2014.
37. Radchenko, n.p.
38. *Ibid.*
39. Saurabh Shukla, "India 'Ready to Let China Keep Aksai Chin' If Neighbor Country Drops Claim to Arunachal Pradesh," *Daily Mail India*, 2013.
40. India's incredible diversity makes collecting a nation-wide representative survey impractical. To note just one measure of diversity, India is home to over 450 languages. Rather than attempt to collect a low-quality sample of such a large country, we opted for a high-quality sample of the capitol region. This area is very diverse, and the survey firm ensured that the sample was as representative of Delhi in terms of age, gender, education, and religion. A significant portion of respondents was domestic migrants, people whose original home state/union territory something other than Delhi. All in all, there were 19 states/union territories represented in the sample. While this is not perfectly representative of India as a whole, Delhi, as the major capitol city, was a good choice for the sample because we expected to get some variation in place of origin. We only had one respondent from Arunachal Pradesh. This is not enough to test any meaningful hypotheses about place of origin's impact on attitude towards the dispute.
41. A detailed discussion of the sampling method can be found in Appendix C.
42. For work on individual's proximity to territorial dispute's influence on attitudes, see Tanaka (2017, pp. 516–517).
43. A comparison between population parameters and sample statistics can be found in Appendix B. To further increase the representativeness of the dataset, authors applied sampling

weights for age, gender, and education. Weighting the sample did not change substantive interpretation of models.

44. Kertzer et al., 2014, Supplemental Material p. 1.
45. Ganguly, Hellwig, and Thompson, 2017, p. 425.
46. Rathbun et al., 2016, p. 125.
47. Kertzer et al., 2014, Supplemental Materials p. 3.
48. Ganguly, Hellwig, and Thompson, 2017, p. 425.
49. Kertzer et al., 2014.
50. Ganguly, Hellwig, and Thompson, 2017, p. 425.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 426.
52. Rathbun et al., 2016, pp. 125–26; Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis, 1995, pp. 323–24.
53. Rathbun et al., 2016, p. 126.
54. Hurwitz, Peffley, and Seligson, 1993, p. 252.
55. James Traub, “Is Modi’s India Safe for Muslims?,” *Foreign Policy*, 2015, June 26.
56. Howard Schaffer and Teresita C. Schaffer, “India: Modi’s International Profile,” *Brookings*, 2013, December 12.
57. Shukla, 2013, n.p.
58. Pinaki Bhattacharyya, “The Shiliguri Corridor Question Mark on Security,” *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, 2001.

Biographical Statements

Sarah Fisher is an assistant professor of politics, law, and international relations at Emory & Henry College. She earned her Ph.D. from the University of Georgia. Her research centers on foreign policy and territorial disputes. Her most recent published work (also coauthored with Florian Justwan) is on conflict management in India and on research methods pedagogy. In addition, she has published work with Kayce Mobley on talking about politics with family members.

Florian Justwan is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Idaho. He earned his Ph.D. from the University of Georgia. His research interests are in the fields of international conflict, conflict management, and political psychology. In particular, he focuses on the roles of heuristics and cognitive biases in the formulation of foreign policy and the formation of public opinion.